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China has responded to some of its ecological challenges with an ambitious reforestation 
project called the Grain to Green Program (GTGP), which pays farmers to plant trees on steeply 
sloping cropland. This is one of many payment for ecosystem services (PES) programs 
throughout the world that acknowledge landholders as providers of environmental benefits and 
compensate them for managing land in a prescribed way. While GTGP and other PES programs 
have produced measurable land cover changes and contributed directly to many families’ 
incomes, policy analyses tend to neglect these programs’ more complex, indirect effects. PES 
intercedes in complex webs of human-environment interactions as people adopt new norms and 
face new challenges and opportunities for their livelihoods. This study aims to demonstrate how 
households’ motivation to enroll in PES goes beyond straightforward microeconomic 
calculations, its potentially permanent impacts on livelihood strategies and land use, and how 
unintended ecological effects may hamper or enhance land change goals. First, it will 
demonstrate how social norms, demographics, and other characteristics impact the decision to 
enroll, and how this knowledge may be used to improve financial and administrative efficiency. 
Second, it will explore how PES funnels farmers into different sectors of the off-farm labor 
market and how these transitions affect the permanence of PES-initiated land cover changes. 
Third, it will investigate how changes in land cover may contribute to a growing wild boar
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population and the burden of crop raiding, and how this burden may influence land use and 
cooperation with GTGP long-term. These findings will contribute to a more comprehensive 
understanding of how PES impacts people and their environment both directly and indirectly, 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
As the severity of ecological degradation and its social consequences has moved to the 
forefront of global attention, governments have responded with massive financial investments in 
conservation; however, most conservation initiatives fail to meet expectations (Ferraro & Kiss, 
2002). Reasons behind the widespread disappointment are extensive and complex, from long 
timeframes to scientific uncertainty (Mickwitz 2003), and some programs produce 
counterintuitive or even unwanted ecological and social results. Part of the challenge in solving 
conservation issues is that environmental problems tend to constitute “social traps,” wherein the 
local consequences of an action that reinforce individual behavior are in conflict with society’s 
long-run best interest (Costanza 1987). While environmental degradation is associated with the 
public costs of privately profitable activities, conservation obligations tend to impose private or 
local costs for global benefit, creating a similar but opposite imbalance between those who bear 
the burdens versus the rewards (Nyaupane & Poudel 2011). Two policy paradigms may correct a 
social trap: superordinate authority (e.g. government regulation) and “converting the trap into a 
tradeoff” (Costanza 1987) through subsidies, taxes, or fees. While early environmental policy 
primarily employed the more direct superordinate authority strategy, recent decades have 
brought conservation efforts into the more voluntary “tradeoff” sphere, where natural resources 
are commodified (Morris 2008) and their users are compensated for managing them in 
prescribed ways. Although morally controversial, many environmental economists argue 
monetizing nonmarket phenomena is the best way to account for all costs and benefits and glean 
the greatest benefit from limited conservation budgets (Duke et al. 2013). Payment for ecosystem 
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services (PES) programs, a relatively new policy mechanism wherein landholders receive direct 
payments for managing resources in prescribed ways to benefit the broader ecosystem and 
society, embody this monetization. In addition to promoting environmental sustainability, these 
programs are often intended to alleviate rural poverty, especially in developing countries, as rural 
land users often comprise some of the poorest populations (Bulte et al. 2008). 
Since 1999, China has been executing an ambitious PES program. The Grain to Green 
Program (GTGP) is one of the world’s most expansive conservation policies in terms of financial 
commitment, geographic extent, duration, and people impacted (Li et al. 2011; Liang et al. 
2012). Through GTGP, rural landholders receive annual per-hectare payments to retire cropland 
and replant it with trees, with the goals of improving ecological integrity while augmenting rural 
incomes. Like many others, this program targets users of steeply sloping parcels (Chen et al. 
2010), which are generally home to both poorer people (Bulte et al. 2008) and more degradable 
land (Liu et al. 2008). Most enrollees are poor farmers (Li et al. 2011; Uchida et al. 2007), and 
the government hopes to reduce the long-standing practice of cultivating steeply sloping, 
erosion-prone land (Uchida et al. 2005) while strengthening and diversifying the rural economy 
(Liang et al. 2012).  With its massive scope and quintessential PES structure, GTGP presents a 
valuable opportunity to research the social and economic implications of PES as well as the 
long-term fate of PES lands. This dissertation explores why farmers enroll in GTGP, its direct 
and indirect effects on their livelihoods, and whether this program is likely to produce permanent 




1.1 Theoretical Framework 
This project is rooted in the “coupled human and natural systems” (CHANS) framework, 
which emphasizes that humans and nature are not just separate entities competing for priority, 
but are inextricably linked and constantly interacting at many points of contact and many scales 
(Liu et al. 2007a). CHANS represents a step beyond traditional human-environment interaction 
research by exploring multi-way connections and feedback loops as opposed to simple cause-
effect relationships (Liu et al. 2007b), as well as nonlinearity, surprise effects, legacy effects, 
resilience, and heterogeneity (An et al. 2014). CHANS also provides a clear bridge between 
natural and social sciences; ecologists have traditionally studied pristine environments with 
minimal human influence, while social scientists tended to assume environmental influence on 
humans was static or inconsequential (Liu et al. 2007a). CHANS thus contributes to social 
science the notion that the balance of nature is dynamic and susceptible to human interference, 
while encouraging natural scientists to research spaces that are more directly important to human 
livelihoods. CHANS theory is of particular interest to PES research because it can help predict, 
avoid, and manage unwanted consequences of incentivized conservation programs by going 
beyond measuring environmental outcomes simply by areas of forest, and beyond assuming its 
social impacts are limited to the payments rural dwellers receive in exchange for calculated, 
rational actions. For example, the impetus to stop farming and perhaps find a non-agricultural job 
may transition a household out of agriculture, affecting local resource harvesting, income, and 
interaction with a broader goods and labor market. There is also the potential for PES-reforested 
environments to harbor crop-damaging wildlife, bringing economic hardship that may ultimately 
breed resistance to the PES program or promote vegetation clearing elsewhere. By modeling 
interactions among human and natural components, researchers and policymakers can better 
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predict the social and environmental outcomes of policy interventions, environmental 
disturbances, and other potential scenarios 
1.2 Project Objectives. 
This project will develop knowledge of how PES influences a complex web of human-
environment interactions, which must be understood to design programs that are optimally 
beneficial for society and the environment. Specifically, it will: 
1. Evaluate how social norms and sociodemographic factors affect cooperation with PES. 
2. Evaluate socioeconomic influences on off-farm work and livelihood strategies amid PES 
enrollment. 
3. Test a new methodology for predicting human-wildlife conflict and evaluate human-
wildlife conflict’s trajectory in the study region since the onset of PES. 
1.2.1 Objective 1: Evaluate how social norms and sociodemographic factors affect cooperation 
with PES 
Adequate recruitment of landholders willing to enroll at an affordable payment level is 
imperative for any PES scheme. Recruitment may be improved by (1) targeting landholders who 
are most likely to enroll, or (2) designing more appealing contracts. Identifying high-potential 
households at the outset of PES recruitment may lower recruitment costs and administrative 
effort while securing enough participation before having to raise the payment level. Meanwhile 
contracts may be designed to be maximally appealing in dimensions other than financial 
compensation. Two fundamental variables in a PES contract are (1) payment level and (2) 
contract duration. Prior studies have shown, intuitively, that higher payment levels increase 
willingness to enroll (Fletcher et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2012; Torres et al. 2013; Layton & 
Siikamaki 2009), although preferences for shorter or longer contract periods are mixed 
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(Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011; Torres et al. 2013; Fletcher et al. 2009). Understanding the 
sensitivity of enrollment to both payment and contract duration will help program designers 
optimize enrollment and improve landholder satisfaction, which may allow them to allocate 
funds more efficiently by lowering recruitment costs and avoiding the need for higher payments 
to make up for suboptimal commitment periods.  
This study also demonstrates how social norms drive PES enrollment, which has so far 
been understudied. Social norms are “shared understandings about actions that are obligatory, 
permitted, or forbidden” (Ostrom 2000, p. 143) that produce a sense of guilt if violated (Ostrom 
2000), acting as a form of informal natural resource governance (Guerry et al. 2015). Although it 
is well-documented that social norms influence small, routine environmental behaviors (Cialdini 
2003; Goldstein & Cialdini 2003; Stern 2000) and community management of common-pool 
resources (Ostrom et al. 1999), it is less understood how they influence the high-commitment, 
financially incentivized, and economically private decision to enroll in PES. PES is often 
theorized as a commodities market (Gomez-Baggethun et al. 2009) which, on the surface, may 
preclude substantial influence of noneconomic factors such as social norms as farmers compare 
potential PES payments with opportunity cost. However, research has shown farmers’ land 
management decisions depend largely on norms and attitudes even when substantial incentives 
are offered (Ahnstrom et al. 2009), and landholders whose management decisions differ from 
their neighbors’ may experience social pressure to change (Chen et al. 2009). This has led some 
authors to theorize that social norms may substantially affect PES enrollment (Kosoy & Corbera 
2009), although very few have demonstrated it empirically (Chen et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2009). 
Understanding the role of social norms presents an opportunity to encourage PES enrollment by 
emphasizing the program's existing popularity. 
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1.2.2 Objective 2: Evaluate socioeconomic influences on off-farm work and livelihood 
strategies amid PES enrollment  
Prior research suggests PES participation has a two-way causal relationship with off-farm 
employment, with considerable implications for the area’s economic strength and structure. 
Economic diversification for rural dwellers is one goal of GTGP (Liang 2012), and this chapter 
will help identify factors that determine GTGP’s success in transitioning rural dwellers out of 
agriculture into other sectors and assess how these changes may influence the long-term fate of 
GTGP lands. The relationship between GTGP and off-farm work may be bidirectional, where 
preexisting off-farm employment encourages enrollment and enrollment encourages off-farm 
employment. Some studies have demonstrated that GTGP households with off-farm income are 
more likely to participate in GTGP (Chen et al. 2012; Zbinden & Lee 2005) although others have 
shown an opposite effect (Layton & Siikamaki 2009; Arriagada et al. 2009), perhaps because 
those with off-farm income are less in need of payments or unable to commit time to a PES 
program (Arriagada et al. 2014). However, in places where off-farm work encourages PES 
enrollment, it may have a positive feedback effect as farmers often pursue new off-farm jobs 
upon enrolling in PES (Zbinden & Lee 2004; Uchida 2009), increasing off-farm income and 
allowing households to put more land into PES. Further, households that have off-farm income 
streams may be more willing to give up cultivation for PES because they already have 
knowledge, skills, and social connections necessary to transition from agricultural work into 
other sectors and are already less dependent on their farmland for income. To this end, Zanella et 
al. (2014) suggest families with more of their labor concentrated on the farm may be reluctant to 
enroll in PES because of the burden of finding other jobs. Still, other studies have found an 
opposite relationship (Layton & Siikamaki 2009), and interviews of Costa Rican landholders 
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showed those who already had substantial off-farm income were less motivated to enroll because 
they did not need the PES payments and because participation in the program would require 
taking time off from their jobs (Arriagada et al. 2014). Understanding how GTGP affects 
farmers’ pursuit of other income is critical to evaluating whether the program is achieving its 
goal of economic diversification and growth. Regardless of the direction in which PES 
enrollment and off-farm work are related, there has been minimal research on the types of work 
PES enrollees pursue. Given the wide range of possibilities, such as opening a local business, 
working on a neighbor’s farm, or migrating to a major city to work in manufacturing, the effects 
of PES on local land use, demographics, and quality of life cannot be predicted without 
differentiating these choices and evaluating barriers to livelihoods that would extend cropland 
retirement while improving household- and community-level economic strength. Answers to 
these questions will help inform which households are most likely to transition away from 
farming permanently and thus pose the lowest risk of re-cultivation, providing the most long-
term conservation per dollar paid. 
1.2.3 Objective 3: Test a new methodology for predicting human-wildlife conflict and evaluate 
human-wildlife conflict’s trajectory in the region since the onset of PES 
Human-wildlife conflict is an increasingly prevalent conservation challenge throughout 
the world, with potentially severe implications for conservation outcomes (Dickman 2010). One 
area of PES research that has been starkly understudied is its associations with human-wildlife 
conflict. As ecosystems recover, growing populations of some animals can threaten the 
livelihoods and safety of rural communities nearby (Ogra 2007), especially when wild mammals 
invade farm fields and raid crops. Not only does crop raiding bring economic hardship to 
already-poor families (Linkie et al. 2007) and contribute to food shortages (Mojo et al. 2014), it 
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can also breed resistance to conservation programs (Nyhus & Tilson 2000) and interfere with 
their success (Linkie et al. 2007). Managing wildlife crop raiding is thus socially and 
environmentally critical. Most studies on crop raiding have taken place in the protected area 
context (Wang et al. 2010; Cai et al. 2008; Ango et al. 2014; Nyhus & Tilson 2000). Given the 
worldwide growth of both human-wildlife conflict (Dickman 2010) and PES-based conservation 
programs (Pattanayak et al. 2010), it is important to understand how these two phenomena 
influence each other in order to protect the rural poor from undue hardships and prevent 
conservation gains from being undermined. 
 Although there is a sizable body of research on how human-wildlife conflict impacts 
farmers and breeds opposition to some conservation initiatives (Redpath et al. 2012; Dickman 
2010), there is minimal information on how human-wildlife conflict affects the results of PES 
programs (Chen et al. 2019) given their voluntary nature and high financial stakes for 
participants. In regions where wildlife causes substantial hardship for farmers, this may have a 
significant effect on PES enrollment as farmers may not want to promote land cover changes that 
encourage destructive animals. However, there may also be an opposite effect if wildlife makes 
farming so difficult that farmers prefer to enroll in PES over continuing to farm vulnerable plots. 
This is especially plausible as crop raiding has been known to cause outright abandonment of 
cropland (Hua et al. 2016). Answers to these questions will help predict the success of PES 
programs in areas of high human-wildlife conflict and inform the payment levels and 
compensation structures needed for farmers to enroll and keep land under conservation as long as 
possible.  
 As in many places around the world, reforestation in China has brought a resurgence of 
wild boar, especially near protected areas (Cai et al. 2008) like Fanjingshan. In China, this 
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problem is particularly challenging because killing wild animals is often illegal, and other 
methods like fencing have proven ineffectual (Cai et al. 2008). Wild boar have brought on 
extensive cropland abandonment (Hua et al. 2016), and the problem may be growing in other 
areas where conservation policies are increasing forest cover allowing wild boar populations to 
flourish. Further exploring how crop raiding affects participation in PES and land use afterward 
will improve the ability to predict uncompensated burdens to farmers, their land use responses, 
and PES’s overall and long-term influence on land cover. 
1.3 Study Site 
 Fanjingshan National Nature Reserve (N27º44’42”—28º03’11”, W108º34’19” –
108º48’30”) is located in northeastern Guizhou Province, southwestern China. Since its 
establishment in 1978, the reserve has attracted attention from conservationists globally and is 
inside one of the world’s 25 biodiversity hotspots (Myers et al. 2000). The mountainous 419-km2 
site is dominated by evergreen, deciduous, and mixed broadleaf forests with tracts of bamboo. 
Elevation varies widely from 400 m to 2560 m. The reserve and its periphery are also home to 
about 13,000 people, most of whom are subsistence farmers, although some have migrated to 
cities for work or found employment in the area’s burgeoning tourism sector (Aitken & An 
2012). Human settlements in the study area have historically brought instances of both 
deforestation and reforestation (Wandersee et al. 2012). As in many other mountainous regions 
inhabited primarily by subsistence farmers, the area has been involved in China’s Grain to Green 
(GTGP) reforestation program since 2000, which aims to provide participants with monetary 
and/or in-kind payments in return for replacing croplands on steep hillslopes with forestland or 
grassland (Liu et al. 2008). A total of 774 of the area’s approximately 3,256 households are 
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enrolled in the program, receiving an average of 230 yuan (currently, 1 yuan = 0.14 USD) per 
mu (15 mu = 1 ha). Through GTGP, the local government has provided farmers with seedlings of 
pine, Chinese fir, or other tree species, along with bamboo seedlings. Figure 1.1 contains a true-
color aerial image of the reserve in August 2016. 
 
Figure 1.1. True color image of study site (reserve boundary in white; agricultural parcels 




This project employs both social and biophysical data. With the exception of remotely 
sensed images, all data was collected by Dr. Li An and colleagues from San Diego State 
University between 2014 and 2016. Further details on their fieldwork and ongoing projects is 
available at complexities.org. 
1.4.1 Household Survey 
 Most data come from two household surveys conducted at Fanjingshan: one in 2014 and 
one in 2015. Data was collected through in-person household interviews of 615 heads-of-
household stratified by 7 townships. The household head was interviewed when possible; 
otherwise any other knowledgeable adult was interviewed. Respondents answered demographic 
questions including gender, education, age, duration of residence, household composition, 
expenditures, agricultural landholdings and activities, and off-farm earnings. They also 
participated in choice experiments that tested their willingness to enroll in PES under various 
conditions. In addition to household-level data, there are individual-level data on demographics, 
work, and migration. The 2014 dataset is more extensive and comprehensive, while the 2015 
dataset delves deeper into agricultural activities and production. Meanwhile the 2015 dataset is 
connected with plot environment data and can be spatially represented.  
1.4.2 Biophysical data 
 Two types of physical data are available: remotely sensed and in-situ. The most important 
form of remotely sensed data is cloud-free Level-2 Landsat images at 5-year time intervals, 
including an Operational Land Imager (OLI) image from August 2016 and Thematic Mapper 
(TM) images from June 2005 and August 2010. (I use a 2016 image instead of a 2015 image 
because there were no suitable summertime images obtained in 2015). These are used to classify 
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land cover and estimate land cover change. They will be supplemented by elevation and 
topographic data derived from a digital elevation model at 90m resolution from the Shuttle Radar 
Topography Mission. In-situ environmental data was collected from 71 plots in 2015 including 
vegetation type, elevation, slope, distance to infrastructure and water features, and presence of 
nearby farms and natural forest conservation sites. In addition, there are 25,270 camera trap 
observations taken at 69 sites using Bushnell Trophy Cam™ between April 2015 and August 
2016 indicating species, date, and geographic coordinates. Each camera trap observation noted 
the species and count. 
1.5 Contributions 
This project models systems-based policy analysis for PES, a policy instrument that is 
often evaluated based on narrow metrics with little regard for feedback effects, time lags, 
nonlinearity, and other key aspects of complex human-environmental systems. It also tests a 
critical facet of environmental behavior: social norms, in a high-incentive, high-commitment 
context, which will offer insight into both PES recruitment and other environmental programs 
that depend on voluntary participation. The project also advances the study of PES and off-farm 
employment by exploring how PES affects off-farm employment differently across the 
community with emphasis on sociodemographic barriers that hinder access to the labor market 
and impede the pursuit of potentially permanent alternatives to on-farm cultivation. Further, it is 
among the first to evaluate how PES and human-wildlife conflict interact, with consideration for 
how it affects landholder cooperation long-term. Additionally, by incorporating landholders’ 
perceptions and beliefs about human-wildlife conflict with purely biophysical models, it will 
help fill a gap in broader environmental management literature regarding dynamic interactions 
among attitudes and understandings that influence resource management (Muhar et al. 2018). In 
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summary, this dissertation furthers the discussion of PES by abandoning assumptions of static 
causal relationships and local generalizability while introducing a novel methodology for 
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CHAPTER 2: NORMATIVE, LIVELIHOOD, AND DEMOGRAPHIC 
INFLUENCES ON ENROLLMENT IN PAYMENT FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 
 
Payment for ecosystem services (PES) has emerged as a leading conservation mechanism 
worldwide, and its success depends largely on rural landholders’ willingness to enroll in and 
comply with these programs. Researchers have suggested program duration and perceived social 
norms may influence enrollment, but empirical evidence is sparse. There is also conflict over the 
influence of other socioeconomic, demographic, and farm characteristics. This study, based in 
Fanjingshan National Nature Reserve in southwestern China, uses a choice experiment and 
random effects model to quantify how payment level, duration of program, social norms, and 
demographic and economic factors affect farmers’ willingness to enroll in PES. Results suggest 
higher neighbor participation increases willingness to enroll, as does higher payment level, but 
contract duration does not. Other factors associated with higher enrollment include lower 
educational attainment, having local off-farm work, owning no livestock, and not having lived in 
one’s current neighborhood since birth. These results suggest PES implementers may improve 
enrollment by targeting households with these conducive characteristics. Moreover, results 
suggest PES administrators may improve enrollment by emphasizing neighbors’ enrollment 
while recruiting new participants, thereby capitalizing on perceived social norms. 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the turn of the millennium, much of the discourse on environmental conservation 
has turned toward the “ecosystem services” framework, which emphasizes the importance of 
ecological processes to human survival and quality of life (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
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2005). The idea of ecosystem services as economic assets has been embraced by many local and 
national governments  (Daily et al. 2009) and NGOs around the world (Milder et al. 2010), 
which have come to see environmental protection as more than a moral inclination, but as an 
economic and humanitarian imperative. It is estimated we lose between $4 trillion and $20 
trillion worth of ecosystem services each year as a result of environmental degradation (Costanza 
et al. 2014), and these losses may largely be attributed to economic externalities that go 
uncorrected in the free market (Kremen & Miles 2012). Given the non-excludability of many 
critical ecosystem services, conserving them requires collective action, often through 
representative institutions (e.g. governments or NGOs) (Farley & Costanza 2010). One policy 
mechanism by which institutions have aimed to preserve ecosystem services is through “payment 
for ecosystem services” (PES), wherein landholders receive financial or in-kind incentives for 
managing their land in ways that promote ecosystem service production (Engel et al. 2008). PES 
is rooted in straightforward economic theory, wherein a willing buyer (i.e. society, often 
represented by a government or NGO (Engel et al. 2008)) purchases ecosystem services from a 
willing seller (i.e. landholder) (Ferraro & Kiss 2002). Rather than imposing strict environmental 
regulations, which can put substantial economic burdens on local communities and make such 
programs unsustainable long term (James et al. 1999), PES sets up a “market” for ecosystem 
services. In theory, landholders enroll if PES payments exceed what they would expect to earn 
from other land uses. In addition to payments, landholders may also be inclined to enroll to 
manage economic risk, adapt to changing household labor availability, or diversify income 
(Milder et al. 2010).  
Opportunity cost is inherently a leading factor in landholders’ willingness to enroll. For 
landholders to experience net financial benefits, PES payments must exceed what they expect to 
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earn from keeping the land under an alternative use now and in the future (Wunder 2005). Still, 
economic considerations that affect enrollment can go beyond the simple subtraction of 
opportunity cost from payment level. Household composition and labor availability can play a 
role (Zbinden & Lee 2005); for example, some studies (Chen et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2009; 
Zanella et al. 2014) have found households with more people (i.e. potential on-farm laborers) 
living in the home are less likely to participate, although others have found no significant 
relationship between household size and participation (Gauvin et al. 2010). Along these lines, 
age of household head may also influence enrollment through labor availability. Chen et al. 
(2009) found households headed by older adults were less likely to reconvert PES land to 
cropland, likely because older adults were less apt to assume the heavy labor required to 
reestablish and cultivate cropland, which may bode well for their willingness to enroll in the first 
place. Existing agricultural assets may also play a role. Those with larger holdings may be able 
to enroll some land in PES while leaving a satisfactory amount in cultivation, or because those 
with more land to enroll stand to collect more in total payments to justify the effort and risk of 
initial signup. Meanwhile livestock may complicate the decision to enroll through its space and 
capital requirements and potentially lucrative returns. 
Another economic influence on PES enrollment is off-farm income; some studies have 
demonstrated households with off-farm income are more likely to participate (Chen et al. 2012; 
Zbinden & Lee 2005), perhaps because they are already less dependent on cultivation. This may 
even have a compounding effect as farmers who enroll often pursue new off-farm jobs because 
PES frees up time once used for cultivation (Zbinden & Lee 2004), and several studies have 
supported a causal relationship from PES to participation in the off-farm labor market (Uchida et 
al. 2009; Yin et al. 2014). Because PES generally has low labor requirements compared to other 
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income-generating activities, it may be considered a supplement rather than a substitute for the 
household’s existing activities, allowing households to maintain both income streams 
simultaneously. However, a few studies have shown a negative effect of off-farm income on 
enrollment (Layton & Siikamaki 2009; Arriagada et al. 2009), perhaps because those with off-
farm income are less in need of payments or are unable to commit enough time to PES 
(Arriagada et al. 2014). To this end, Uchida et al. (2009) suggest wealthier and poorer 
households may experience opposite relationships between PES enrollment and off-farm income, 
where wealthier households receiving PES payments are less likely to work off-farm because it 
is no longer necessary, while poorer households seize the free time and financial liquidity to 
pursue more off-farm work. While these authors investigated causation from PES enrollment to 
off-farm work while we explore the opposite, it stands to reason that poorer households would be 
more motivated to supplement off-farm income with PES payments than their wealthier 
counterparts. In addition to the uncertain influence of off-farm income itself, its effect may differ 
by type of work, whether local wage work, small-scale entrepreneurship, or migrant labor in 
cities. China’s PES program is hoped to encourage off-farm employment (Li et al. 2011) and 
entrepreneurship (Kolinjivadi & Sunderland 2012), and evidence from Ecuador suggests PES 
may encourage ecotourism enterprising (Bremer et al. 2014). Meanwhile payments may allow 
for increased migrant work by providing funds for transportation (Zhen et al. 2013; Adamo & 
Izazola 2010). 
PES enrollment is also influenced by factors separate from the economics of opportunity 
cost and labor allocation. One motivator that is yet understudied is social norms, or “shared 
understandings about actions that are obligatory, permitted, or forbidden” (Ostrom 2000, p. 143) 
that produce a sense of guilt if violated (Ostrom 2000). Social norms can act as a form of natural 
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resource governance (Guerry et al. 2015), forming an informal system of “peer sanctions and 
rewards” (Narloch et al. 2012, p. 2098) that affect behavior. Although it is well-documented that 
social norms influence small, routine environmental behaviors (Cialdini 2003; Cialdini & 
Goldstein 2003; Stern 2000) and community management of common-pool resources (Ostrom et 
al. 1999), it is less understood how they influence the high-commitment, financially incentivized, 
and economically private decision to enroll in PES. PES is often theorized as a commodities 
market (Gomez-Baggethun et al. 2009) which, on the surface, may overshadow any 
noneconomic factors such as social norms as farmers compare potential PES payments with 
opportunity costs. However, research has shown farmers’ land management decisions depend 
largely on norms and attitudes even when substantial incentives are offered (Ahnstrom et al. 
2009), and landholders whose management decisions differ from their neighbors’ may 
experience social pressure to change (Chen et al. 2009b). This has led some authors to theorize 
that social norms may substantially affect PES enrollment (Kosoy & Corbera 2009), although so 
far only a few have demonstrated this empirically (Chen et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2009b; Yost et 
al. 2020).  
Despite limited quantitative evidence, there is a growing qualitative discussion of how 
the external, incentive-based nature of PES interacts with and affects normative motivations 
toward conservation. Some authors caution that incentive payments may undermine existing pro-
environmental norms because explicit payments to individual landholders may shift the “locus of 
responsibility” for environmental protection to those explicitly receiving compensation, 
degrading any preexisting ethical or communal motivations (Van Hecken & Bastiaensen 2010). 
Further, the PES market may engender competition among neighbors that impedes collective 
action for the environment (Narloch et al. 2012). On the other hand, a market-based system may 
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also encourage interaction among neighbors, facilitating social learning, encouraging pro-
environmental social norms to develop, and benefiting environmental protection over long-term, 
and if people generally understand PES contributes to the common good, social norms may 
evolve to encourage participation (Narloch et al. 2012). Pattanayak et al. (2010) offer a 
compromise position between PES’s potential to undermine or encourage pro-environmental 
norms. They suggest community norms, markets, and government have “complementary roles” 
in environmental protection, and PES may help close the gap between what is privately optimal 
(i.e. the landholder’s economic interest) and what is socially optimal. Given the complex 
relationships among normative, regulatory, and economic factors of farmers’ land management 
decisions, it is yet unclear how strong or direct any relationship between social norms and PES 
enrollment is.  
China’s Grain to Green Program (GTGP) presents a valuable opportunity to research 
farmers’ motivations for enrolling their farmland in PES, from both economic and otherwise 
perspectives. Established in 1999, GTGP is among the world’s largest PES programs in terms of 
financial commitment, geographical expanse, number of people impacted, and duration (Li et al. 
2011; Liang et al. 2012). GTGP targets steeply sloping land and compensates farmers with a flat 
per-hectare payment of grain or cash (based on whether the region lies in the Yangtze or Yellow 
River basin), plus a one-time subsidy for seeds/seedlings and other planting expenses (Liu et al. 
2008). Most enrollees are poor farmers in mountainous areas (Li et al. 2011; Uchida et al. 2007), 
where the government hopes to reduce the long-standing practice of cultivating steeply sloping, 
erosion-prone land (Uchida et al. 2005) and strengthen and diversify the economic structure of 
agrarian China (Liang et al. 2012). GTGP helps accomplish these socioeconomic goals by 
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transferring state money into rural communities and providing a guaranteed income stream, 
which may free many enrollees from cultivation and help them enter nonagricultural sectors. 
In addition to the relatively passive approach of asking who will participate in PES and 
why, we may also ask how to design more appealing PES programs in which more landholders 
will want to enroll. Two fundamental variables in a PES contract are (1) payment level and (2) 
contract duration. In prior choice experiments, wherein, landholders are asked whether they 
would enroll in PES under given conditions, higher payments consistently led to higher 
willingness to enroll (Fletcher et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2012; Torres et al. 2013; Layton & 
Siikamaki 2009). Studies that test preferred contract duration, however, have shown mixed 
results. A few have found landholders preferred shorter contract periods (Markowski-Lindsay et 
al. 2011; Torres et al. 2013), but Fletcher et al. (2009) found their subjects preferred longer time 
commitments. Understanding the sensitivity of enrollment to contract duration will help program 
designers optimize enrollment and improve landholder satisfaction, which may allow them to 
allocate funds more efficiently by lowering recruitment costs and avoiding the need for higher 
payments to make up for suboptimal commitment periods.  
Enrollment in PES can also vary considerably by demographic factors. Prior research has 
suggested men hold more positive attitudes toward the program (Hu et al. 2006), although 
women are more likely to reenroll after the initial contract period (Chen et al. 2009), perhaps 
because female-headed households are missing an adult male laborer who would have facilitated 
farm work. This may be because female-headed households are often those wherein the primary 
male adult has migrated (Zhang et al. 2004) or passed away, perhaps creating a labor shortage 
within the household and making the less labor-intensive option (i.e. PES) more attractive, 
especially when the household has a larger area to manage. Older respondents may also be more 
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likely to enroll and remain in GTGP likely due to declining physical abilities amid the manual 
labor cultivation demands (Chen et al. 2010; Chen et al. 2009). Along these lines, household size 
may affect enrollment through labor availability. Chen et al. (2009) found households with more 
laborers were more likely to reconvert GTGP lands to agriculture after the initial contract period 
because these households can more easily meet the increased labor demand to transition from 
GTGP management to cultivation. Household size may also be indicative of a family’s life stage 
and age of the household head; those with fewer members may be “empty nests” in which 
household heads are nearing retirement (Lambert et al. 2006) or where parents are raising a 
young child(ren). It thus stands to reason that larger households are more likely to enroll in 
GTGP.  
Farm characteristics can also be influential. Those with larger holdings may be able to 
enroll some land in PES while leaving a satisfactory amount in cultivation, or those with more 
land to enroll stand to collect more in total payments to justify the effort and risk of initial 
signup. Livestock ownership, a well-established challenge in environmental conservation, may 
also be influential as its lucrativeness and space requirements are a notorious driver of 
deforestation (Steinfeld & Gerber 2010s). Conversely, evidence from the United States’ 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) suggests farmers are more likely to reenroll after the 
initial contract period if they had cattle because they could graze them on CRP lands with 
adjusted payments (Johnson 1997). GTGP does not explicitly prohibit participants from keeping 
livestock on converted land, so some landholders may plan to maintain their cattle while earning 
PES payments from a given parcel. 
Off-farm income is another important consideration due to the impacts of financial 
constraints and livelihood alternatives on enrollment. Households that have relatively stable off-
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farm income streams may be more willing to give up cultivation for PES because they are less 
economically dependent on the land and may already have knowledge, skills, and social 
connections necessary to transition from agricultural work into other sectors. Meanwhile the 
income from off-farm work could affect enrollment because higher-income households have 
more financial liquidity to transition further out of agriculture into other sectors (Pagiola et al. 
2004; Uchida 2009). Along these lines, education may encourage enrollment if more educated 
farmers feel more confident in their ability to find off-farm jobs to replace on-farm earnings. 
Higher educational attainment has also been shown to increase support for GTGP (Hu et al. 
2006), which may further increase propensity to enroll. Alternatively, less-educated farmers may 
be more inclined to enroll if they are seeking a more reliable income stream than what they 
expect to earn from cultivation, and lack of education limits their ability to stabilize or diversify 
their income in other ways.  
This study, conducted at China’s Fanjingshan National Nature Reserve, uses a choice 
experiment to measure landholders’ propensity to enroll in PES under different payment levels 
and contract periods, with special attention to perceived social norms. It tests the effect of social 
norms by correlating a landholder’s willingness to enroll with the randomly selected percentage 
of neighbors who would enroll, while also evaluating the influences of various payment levels, 
contract durations, and household characteristics. Results will demonstrate the influence of 
perceived social norms on enrollment, providing insight into whether messaging that emphasizes 
the pervasiveness or popularity of a given PES program will promote further enrollment. Results 
will also show the sensitivity of enrollment to other variables, especially various payment and 





2.2.1 Study Area 
 Fanjingshan National Nature Reserve (N27º44’42”—28º03’11”, W108º34’19” –
108º48’30”) is located in Guizhou Province, southwestern China (Figure 2.1), and is considered 
one of the world’s top 25 “biodiversity hotspots” (Myers et al. 2000). Since its establishment in 
1978, the reserve has attracted global attention from conservationists. This 419-km2 site is home 
to about 13,000 people, most of whom are farmers, although some have migrated to cities for 
manufacturing work or found employment in the area’s burgeoning tourism sector (Yost et al. 
2020). However, benefits from the economic upturn and access to employment provided by the 
tourism industry are uneven and concentrated near accessible areas (Aitken & An 2012). As a 
mountainous area inhabited primarily by impoverished subsistence farmers, the area has been 
involved in GTGP since 2000 for eight years. Around 774 of the area’s approximately 5,000 
households are enrolled in the program, receiving an average of US$507 per ha between 2000 
and 2008, with some variation by year and parcel location. The region’s natural vegetation 
includes evergreen, deciduous, and mixed broadleaf forests, while GTGP has provided for the 
expansion of pine, Chinese fir, and bamboo. The second round of GTGP contracts began in 2008 




Figure 2.1. Aerial image of Fanjingshan National Nature Reserve (boundary in white) 
 
2.2.2 Household Survey 
 In-person interviews were conducted with households in a stratified random sample. 
Based on a 2013 census that had identified 3,256 households, 1160 households were selected in 
hopes of obtaining 650 usable interviews after eliminating households with no knowledgeable 
member present due to travel or other circumstances. The 3,256 households were divided into 
123 sampling units; 58 of these units were selected and assigned to 20 administrative villages in 
proportion to each village’s population size. This produced a slight overrepresentation of smaller 
villages. 20 households were selected from each administrative village per sampling unit; 1,160 
households were ultimately selected and full surveys were completed for 605 households in 
2014. The household head was interviewed when possible; otherwise another available adult was 
interviewed. In all, 605 household interviews were completed. Respondents answered 
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demographic questions including gender, education, age, duration of residence, household 
composition, agricultural holdings, and off-farm earnings. Respondents then participated in a 
choice experiment (Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011; Layton & Siikamaki 2009; An et al. 2002) in 
which they were presented with three different PES contract scenarios. Each scenario was 
comprised of a randomly selected payment level (121, 242 or 726 USD per ha), contract duration 
(4, 8, or 12 years), and the percentage of neighbors who would enroll (25%, 50%, or 75%). For 
each scenario, the respondent was asked whether he or she would be willing to enroll any of their 
existing farmland plots, to which he or she responded “yes,” “no,” or “unsure.” Although it must 
be noted that expressing intent to enroll is an imperfect indicator for actual enrollment, intentions 
are generally effective predictors of behavior (Madden et al. 1992) and are thus deemed a 
reasonable proxy here.  
2.2.3 Data Analysis 
 Data were grouped by household and analyzed with a random effects logistic regression 
model. This provided 282 “groups” (households) with three observations per household. The 
binary dependent variable was whether or not the person would be willing to enroll in the given 
PES scenario, with “yes” coded as 1 and “no” and “do not know” coded as 0. Other variables 
that varied within each household included payment level (yuan per mu), contract duration 
(years), post-enrollment land use option, and neighbor participation rate (25%, 50% or 75%). 
Due to the discrete, three-level nature of each parameter, they were treated as categorical 
variables. Analysis also controlled for farm and socioeconomic characteristics that may have 
impacted propensity to enroll in PES, including area of agricultural landholdings, livestock 
ownership, off-farm income, household size, gender, age, and education of the respondent 
(years), and whether or not the respondent had lived in the neighborhood since birth. In addition, 
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a separate regression was run for the lowest payment group and the combined moderate and high 
payment group to shed light on whether the effects of social norms and other factors were 
consistent among those receiving low, moderate, and high payments. Similarly, we ran separate 
regressions for households with and without off-farm income streams to illustrate how and why a 
household’s degree of economic dependence on agriculture impacted enrollment. 
2.3 Results 
Across all responses to PES scenarios, 56.9% of responses were “yes,” 43.1% were “no” 
or “unsure.” Contract parameters (i.e. payment level and duration), which were randomly 
selected for each scenario, were approximately evenly distributed. 34.4% of scenarios offered the 
lowest payment level (242 USD per ha), 34.0% offered the middle payment level (484 USD per 
ha), and 31.6% offered the highest payment level (726 USD per ha). 33.8% of scenarios were for 
4 years, 38.3% for 8 years, and 27.9% for 12 years. Neighbor participation rates were 24.8% at 
25%, 44.1% at 50%, and 31.1% at 75%. Sample descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 
2.1.  In the primary regression with all payment levels and off-farm work statuses combined, 
odds of enrollment increased by a factor of 2.13 (p<0.05) when per-ha payment was raised from 
242 USD to 484 USD and by a factor of 7.85 (p<0.01) when it was increased to 726 USD. 
Increasing neighbor participation from 25% to 50% increased odds of enrollment by a factor of 
5.54 (p<0.01), and increasing neighbor participation to 75% increased odds of enrollment by a 
factor of 8.27 (p<0.01). Contract duration had no significant effect on willingness to enroll. 
Control variables were tested for multicollinearity using variance inflation factors (VIFs) 
calculated after a placeholder linear regression with the same structure of the logistic regression, 
separated by scenario number; no VIF exceeded 1.32. Additionally, a correlation matrix among 
control variables showed the absolute values of all correlation coefficients were less than 0.26, so 
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it was decided multicollinearity was not a major problem for the model. Area of agricultural land 
had a marginally positive significant effect (odds increased by factor of 8.76 with a one-ha 
increase in cropland; p<0.10), while livestock ownership decreased willingness to enroll by a 
factor of 0.189 (p<0.05). Respondents whose households had local off-farm wage work were 
also more likely to express intent to enroll (factor of 9.58; p<0.01), although entrepreneurship or 
migrant work did not. Odds of enrollment increased marginally with age (factor of 1.05 per year; 
p<0.10) and decreased with education (factor of 0.744 per year; p<0.01). Respondents who had 
lived in the same neighborhood since birth were considerably less likely to enroll (factor of 
0.076; p<0.01). Household size, and gender showed no significant effect on enrollment. 
Probability of enrollment by household characteristic with 95% confidence interval is shown in 
Figure 2.2. Odds ratios for all variables’ effects on enrollment are illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
Table 2.1. Demographic and scenario sample descriptors 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Willing to enroll 0.569  
Payment (USD/ha/year) 478 196 
Duration (years) 7.77 3.13 
Neighbors (%) 51.6 18.6 
Off-farm wage work 0.228  
Self-employment 0.150  
Migrant 0.629  
Cropland area (ha) 0.413 0.291 
Female (1=yes) 0.228  
Age (years) 53.8 12.9 
Lived here since birth (1=yes) 0.788  
Livestock (1=yes) 0.784 0.411 





Figure 2.2. Proportion of households willing to enroll in GTGP by household or household head 
characteristic 
 
When examining a separate logistic regression by payment group, increasing neighbor 
participation from 25% to 50% or 75% increased probability of enrollment for the two higher 
payment levels (484 USD and 726 USD per ha combined), but not at the lowest payment level 
(242 USD per ha). In the higher payment groups, increasing neighbor participation from 25% to 
50% increased odds of enrollment by a factor of 4.26 (p<0.01); increasing neighbor participation 
to 75% increased the odds by a factor of 8.35 (p<0.01). Other variables also displayed disparate 
effects among payment groups. Agricultural land area had a marginal positive influence on 
enrollment for those in the middle and higher payment groups (factor of 6.55; p<0.10) but not 
significant for the low or high payment group. Livestock ownership was marginally, negatively 
correlated with enrollment in the lowest payment group (factor of 0.082; p<0.10) but not 
significant for the two higher payment groups. Meanwhile negative effect of education decreased 












by a factor of 0.790 when payment was moderate or high (p<0.05). Similarly, the significance of 
local off-farm wages diminished as payment increased; it increased odds of enrollment by a 
factor of 21.0 when payment was low (p<0.05) but had a smaller effect when payment was 
moderate or high (factor of 6.79; p<0.05). Lifelong residents were at least marginally less likely 
to express intent to enroll across all payment levels: by a factor of 0.021 at the lowest payment 
level (p<0.05) and a factor of 0.117 at the higher two payment levels (p<0.01). Contract 
duration, gender, age, household size, self-employment, and migrant work remained insignificant 
across all payment levels. 
Results also differed between households with and without any type of off-farm income 
(local wage work, entrepreneurship, or migration) (Table 2.2). Raising per-ha payment from 242 
USD to 484 USD increased odds of participation by a factor of 2.23 (p<0.05) for households 
with off-farm income, but showed no significant effect for those without. Similarly, raising 
payment to 726 USD increased odds by a factor of 10.5 (p<0.01) for households with off-farm 
income, while the effect for those without was smaller and marginal (factor of 4.20; p<0.10). 
Meanwhile there was a marginal, negative effect of being female on enrollment in households 
without off-farm income (factor of 0.068; p<0.10) that was not visible for households with off-
farm income. Conversely, the negative effects of lifelong residence (factor of 0.056; p<0.01) and 
livestock ownership (factor of 0.115; p<0.05) were only visible for households with off-farm 
income. The effects of social norms were similar between the two groups; increasing neighbor 
participation to 50% increased odds of enrollment by a factor of 4.22 (p<0.05) for households 
without off-farm income and a factor of 6.59 (p<0.01) for those with off-farm income. Increasing 
neighbor participation to 75% increased odds of participation by a factor of 13.7 (p<0.01) and 
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7.36 (p<0.01) respectively. Contract duration, cropland area, and age were insignificant 
predictors for both groups. 
  
Table 2.2. Odds ratios regression for willingness to enroll in GTGP 
Variable All Low Moderate-high No OFI OFI 
Moderate payment 2.13**   1.91 2.23** 
 (1.11, 4.08)   (0.476, 7.68) (1.05, 4.76) 
High payment 7.85***   4.20* 10.5*** 
 (3.64, 16.95)   (0.973, 18.2) (3.95, 27.6) 
8 years 0.680 0.526 0.646 0.691 0.800 
 (0.329, 1.41) (0.067, 4.15) (0.259, 23.7) (0.083, 2.00) (0.340, 27.6) 
12 years 0.707 0.445 0.477 0.402 0.886 
 (0.322, 1.55) (0.035, 5.66) (0.181, 1.26) (0.084, 1.91) (0.346, 2.27) 
50% participation 5.54*** 3.89 4.26*** 4.22** 6.59*** 
 (2.55, 11.99) (0.337, 44.9) (1.67, 10.8) (1.01, 17.1) (2.55, 17.0) 
75% participation 8.27*** 2.37 8.35*** 13.7*** 7.36*** 
 (3.34, 20.44) (0.196, 33.5) (2.82, 24.7) (2.05, 91.1) (2.53, 21.4) 
Area (ha) 8.76* 10.5 6.55* 16.4 5.40 
 (0.965, 79.6) (0.012, 3.75) (0.766, 56.0) (0.276, 977) (0.339, 86.1) 
Female 0.602 2.86 0.886 0.0688* 0.712 
 (0.117, 3.10) (0.423, 565) (0.189, 4.15) (0.004, 1.29) (0.084, 6.04) 
Education (years) 0.744*** 0.404** 0.790** 0.811 0.710** 
 (0.606, 0.914) (0.423, 0.948) (0.652, 0.958) (0.551, 1.19) (0.547, 0.922) 
Age 1.05* 1.08 1.03 1.02 1.05 
 (0.992, 1.11) (0.976, 1.19) (0.983, 1.09) (0.933, 1.12) (0.980, 1.13) 
Off-farm wage work 9.58*** 21.0** 6.79**   
 (1.93, 47.6) (1.06, 416) (1.48, 31.2)   
Business 0.732 0.854 0.854   
 (0.118, 4.53) (0.044, 16.8) (0.154, 4.73)   
Migrant 2.64 6.55 2.14   
 (0.667, 10.5) (0.570, 75.4) (0.586, 7.85)   
Lifelong resident 0.0755*** 0.0208** 0.117*** 0.198 0.0561*** 
 (0.015, 0.380) (0.0008, 0.546) (0.025, 0.546) (0.009, 4.25) (0.007, 0.451) 
Household size 1.04 1.17 0.926 0.832 1.15 
 (0.649, 1.67) (0.546, 2.52) (0.595, 1.44) (0.310, 2.23) (0.633, 2.04) 
Livestock 0.189** 0.0817* 0.307 0.918 0.115** 
 (0.038, 0.942) (0.0046, 1.44) (0.067, 1.40) (0.059, 14.3) (0.014, 0.959) 
Obs. (Groups) 992 (334) 287 (267) 548 (282) 190 (64) 651 (220) 
      
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01    
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2.4 Discussion 
 The positive relationship between intent to enroll in PES and rate of enrollment in the 
neighborhood offer strong evidence that landholders are more likely to enroll in PES if social 
norms support the decision. While intentions are imperfect indicators of behavior, they are the 
fundamental antecedents of behavior (Madden et al. 1992) and are reasonable proxies for actual 
behavior especially when beliefs about the behavior are unlikely to change between the time of 
expressed intention and the time of behavior (Ajzen et al. 2004). The results of this study are 
consistent with Chen et al.’s (2009b) study, in which landholders who were told that a greater 
percentage of their neighbors would enroll were more likely to express intent to enroll in GTGP. 
This highlights potential for PES administrators to improve enrollment by communicating 
existing community participation and support. In their simulation of stakeholder interactions at a 
GTGP site over time, Chen et al. (2012) show leveraging social norms may have a compounding 
effect whereby emphasizing the popularity of PES participation encourages new enrollment, 
thereby increasing its popularity and driving more enrollment in the future. Although there is yet 
a shortage of research on how social norms affect PES enrollment, this and other studies 
produced so far provide compelling and consistent evidence for their importance in landholder 
recruitment. Intuitively, willingness to enroll also increased with payment (Torres et al. 2013; 
Beharry-Borg et al. 2013; Ma et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2012; Fletcher et al. 2009; Layton & 
Siikamaki 2009; Lambert et al. 2006).  
 Contract duration did not have a significant effect on willingness to enroll in the overall 
regression. Contract duration is fundamental to PES program design (Martin-Ortega et al. 2013), 
although evidence is yet inconclusive regarding landholders’ preferences on the matter. Further, 
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Wunder and Alban (2008) point out farmers can escape longer contracts by violating the terms. 
If there is no early withdrawal penalty (Fletcher et al. 2009; Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011), the 
option of quitting PES simply by returning to cultivation and forgoing payments may make 
farmers less concerned over contract length. This may be the case in GTGP, wherein farmers 
who violate contract terms may not receive GTGP funds but are not fined or otherwise penalized. 
Given this study’s lack of correlation between contract duration and willingness to enroll, it 
appears male farmers at Fanjingshan give less consideration to contract duration or simply plan 
to stop participating and forgo payments if they change their minds midway through the contract.  
A few landholder and farm characteristics were also correlated with willingness to enroll 
in PES. Men were more likely to enroll in GTGP than women, which might be due to their 
higher propensities to migrate to cities for higher-paying jobs (Zhang et al. 2019); although we 
are not aware of any other PES studies with this result, evidence for the role of gender in PES 
enrollment is inconsistent and inconclusive. A few studies that have found no significant effect 
of gender on PES enrollment (Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011; Chen et al. 2009; Chen et al. 
2012), although Lambert et al. (2006) found American farms with female operators were more 
likely to adopt conservation programs. To our knowledge, this is the first study to suggest men 
are more likely to enroll in PES than women, but it is plausible given evidence that men have 
more positive attitudes toward GTGP than women do (Hu et al. 2006). It is yet unclear how a 
landholder’s gender affects PES decisions in China, but migration by men may account for 
women’s greater propensity to express intent to enroll in this study. 
Consistent with conventional wisdom, landholders who owned livestock were less likely 
to enroll in GTGP, especially when payment was low and the household had at least one stream 
of off-farm income. This may reflect the role of livestock in income diversification (Ellis 2000); 
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households with livestock and/or off-farm income have already diversified their income 
portfolios in at least one way, which may make them less inclined to forego cultivation for 
capped GTGP payments. Meanwhile cropland area was only a marginal predictor in the primary 
model and insignificant in most sub-models, perhaps because land distribution is meant to be 
functionally egalitarian with each household allocated parcels of different quality (Tan et al. 
2006). Thus, a household with more total land may not have more “usable” land, and thus may 
not have more to relinquish to PES while maintaining a satisfactory area for cultivation. 
However, this contrasts with recent results by Yost et al. (2020), who found households with 
more “leftover” land after enrollment were more likely to express intent to enroll. This suggests 
the relationship between cropland area and GTGP enrollment needs further elucidation.  
Respondents who had lived in the neighborhood since birth were considerably less likely 
to enroll. This is consistent with Arriagada et al.’s (2009) finding that farmers who had lived on 
their current properties 13 years earlier were less likely to enroll, suggesting longer-established 
farming households may be less attracted to PES. Although Arriagada et al. (2009) did not 
attempt to explain this effect, Lambert et al. (2006) may offer some insight. When given the 
choice between conservation programs that allowed continued cultivation and those that entailed 
retiring cropland entirely, their study hypothesized more experienced farmers would opt for 
continued cultivation, perhaps because they expected more experienced farmers to feel more 
confident in their ability to optimize production and manage obstacles. The relationship between 
experience and PES enrollment was not statistically significant in their study, but their 
expectation for more-experienced (likely longer-established) farming households to opt to 
continue cultivation may apply here. Farmers who have lived in the same neighborhood since 
birth may better understand spatial variation in the area’s land quality and which techniques to 
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use on challenging plots. These farmers may thus experience less frustration that would motivate 
others to abandon cultivation for PES payments, which provide guaranteed per-hectare returns. 
Education was negatively correlated with propensity to enroll; the relationship was 
marginal among all respondents but highly significant for those without off-farm income. This 
negative relationship contradicts many empirical studies that have found a positive correlation 
between educational attainment and PES enrollment (Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011; Ma et al. 
2012; Zbinden & Lee 2005; Lambert et al. 2006). The effect may be different at Fanjingshan 
because educational attainment was overall quite low, as is common in rural China (Lu 2012); 
almost 20% of respondents had never attended school and less than 4% had completed high 
school. Although education promotes cooperation with conservation efforts at other sites, the 
education most Fanjingshan residents receive may not encompass enough environmental studies 
to produce pro-environmental motivations. Further, consider how education can contribute to 
PES enrollment by qualifying farmers for off-farm jobs (Yost et al. 2020; Chen et al. 2009). 
Farmers with lower education may be less confident in their abilities to diversify their income in 
other ways, whether locally or by migrating to cities, so they may be more attracted to GTGP’s 
income-stabilizing influence. This is reinforced by the finding that education was a significant 
negative predictor of enrollment only for respondents with off-farm income. Further, the 
simplicity of GTGP may also dampen any positive influence of education. Zbinden and Lee 
(2005) suggest education increases farmers’ propensity to adopt new conservation practices by 
helping them gather and process information, especially if the practices are knowledge-intensive. 
It may be that GTGP enrollment and execution are simple enough, or because administrators 
provide enough technical and administrative assistance, that education is not a bottleneck factor.  
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Respondents with local off-farm income were more likely to express intent to enroll, 
corroborating a few studies that have also found off-farm income encourages PES participation 
(Chen et al. 2009; Zbinden & Lee 2005; Zanella et al. 2014). This is likely because households 
that already had non-farm income sources are less economically dependent on their farmland and 
had already transitioned to alternate lines of work. To this end, Zanella et al. (2014) suggest 
families with more of their labor concentrated on the farm may be reluctant to enroll in PES 
because of the burden of finding other jobs. Still, our finding conflicts with other studies that 
have found an opposite relationship (Layton & Siikamaki 2009; Arriagada et al. 2014). In 
interviews of Costa Rican landholders, those who already had substantial off-farm income 
indicated they were less motivated to enroll because they did not need the PES payments and 
because participation in the program would require taking time off from their jobs (Arriagada et 
al. 2014). However, the reasons behind these negative relationships between off-farm income 
and PES enrollment may be less relevant to GTGP participants in rural China. Layton and 
Siikamaki’s (2009) study addressed private forest owners in a high-income country (Finland), 
while some Costa Rican farmers in Arriagada et al.’s (2014) study who said their off-farm 
income was “enough” may not experience poverty to the extent that China’s GTGP participants 
often do (Li et al. 2011). The relationship between PES and off-farm employment found in this 
study thus supports the theory that off-farm employment encourages PES enrollment overall, 








Figure 2.4. Odds ratios of neighbor participation level by payment level 
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payment level, education, gender, duration of residence, and livestock ownership. Increasing 
payment from the lowest to highest level increased propensity to enroll among all respondents, 
but increasing from the lowest to the middle level only increased propensity to enroll among 
those without off-farm income streams. This suggests landholders are more likely to enroll and 
accept low PES payments if they are completely dependent on agriculture for income, likely 
because these payments are guaranteed and help mitigate risk, even if they do not fully cover the 
opportunity cost of foregone cultivation. Conversely, households with off-farm income streams 
may be less inclined to accept a lower-paying GTGP contract because they have already 
achieved income diversity that protects them against unstable agricultural returns. This may also 
be why there is a significant, negative relationship between cattle ownership and enrollment only 
for those with off-farm income. Farmers in many developing rural areas invest in livestock to 
diversify and store wealth (Ellis 2000); households with both livestock and off-farm employment 
already have two forms of diversification, and may thus be less attracted to PES than households 
whose only diversification is livestock.  
Similarly, the negative relationship between education and enrollment may only be 
visible for households with off-farm income because education influences the potential 
lucrativeness of off-farm employment; those with higher education have likely already 
diversified and augmented their incomes to the point where PES is less necessary, whereas 
households that have not diversified outside of agriculture are drawn to PES’s income-stabilizing 
influence regardless of their education. Finally, lifelong residence in the neighborhood was only 
a significant negative predictor of enrollment among those with off-farm income. This may be 
because lifelong residents are more familiar with spatial and temporal variability in land 
attributes that may frustrate more newly-established households, making them less likely to opt 
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for a flat PES payment over potentially more lucrative cultivation especially when they have 
already diversified their income portfolios. Households completely dependent on agriculture, 
however, may be attracted to guaranteed PES payments regardless of their experience with their 
land. 
Age was positively but marginally correlated with willingness to enroll. This is consistent 
with a few studies that have found older respondents are more likely to enroll (Chen et al. 2012; 
Chen et al. 2009), but uncertainty remains as others have found an opposite effect (Layton & 
Siikamaki 2009) or no effect (Zbinden & Lee 2005). This inconsistency may suggest age has a 
complex effect on PES enrollment. Older farmers may be drawn to PES as a way to scale down 
production as they near retirement, although their age may make them more risk-averse and 
more reluctant to sign onto an unfamiliar government program. Meanwhile a young, less-
established landholder may feel greater pressure for short-term revenue, making the long-term 
restrictions of PES less attractive (Zbinden & Lee 2005). The literature overall supports a 
positive relationship between age and PES enrollment as older farmers seek relief from the 
physical demands of cultivation, but this study provides only weak evidence for that narrative. 
Household size was an insignificant predictor of enrollment, consistent with Lambert et al. 
(2006)’s study of American CRP participants but in contrast with Yost et al.’s (2020) and Chen 
et al.’s (2012) studies of GTGP participants which found larger households were less likely to 
intend to enroll presumably due to higher labor availability for cultivation. While both these 
preceding studies also took place in rural China, the relationship may have been too weak to be 
statistically significant in this model because additional members may be comprised of elders or 
young children with lower labor capacity. This study does not convincingly contradict the notion 
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that larger households are less likely to enroll, but it does highlight the potentially limited 
predictive power household size has on enrollment after other factors are controlled.  
Separating regressions by payment level suggested social norms are only influential when 
payments are moderate or high, likely because farmers cannot afford to give heavy consideration 
to social norms when payment is far lower than opportunity costs. This supports Chen et al.’s 
(2012) simulation of landholder decisions that found perceived social norms had a stronger effect 
on PES participation when payment was moderate versus low. Results reveal considerable 
potential for program administrators to boost enrollment substantially by leveraging social 
norms, but suggest these tactics will only work if a reasonable payment is offered in the first 
place. It also appears the effect of off-farm wages varies by payment level; its effect is 
significant for the lowest payment group but not significant for the higher two, which suggests 
households with off-farm income can better afford to accept low returns on their agricultural 
land. Meanwhile the negative effect of education may weaken as payment level increases 
because low-education households have fewer options for off-farm work to stabilize their 
income, making the guaranteed PES payments more appealing even if they are low, whereas 
higher-educated households will only opt for PES when payments are high. Similarly, livestock 
ownership is only significant for the lowest payment group, perhaps because the income 
diversifying effect of livestock (Ellis 2000) reduces the need to diversify in other ways like PES, 
especially when PES payments are low. 
Given the greater propensity to accept a PES contract among respondents who are told 
more of their neighbors will do the same, it appears social norms have a strong positive effect on 
PES enrollment. Administrators may thus improve recruitment by catalyzing the diffusion of 
pro-PES social norms. One way to accomplish this is by emphasizing how many others in the 
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community have already committed or expressed intent to enroll. Hosting public meetings may 
further encourage diffusion of pro-PES social norms by bringing landholders into close 
interaction. Public meetings would also be an opportunity for administrators to inform 
landholders on the program, which has been shown to increase propensity to enroll in and of 
itself (Page & Bellotti 2015; Zbinden & Lee 2005; Zanella et al. 2014). Social norm diffusion, 
whether it arises naturally from regular interactions among neighbors or is facilitated by 
administrators’ efforts, likely has a greater effect on enrollment when contract cycles are only a 
few years long (Chen et al. 2012), which is not the case for GTGP. Still, social norms may 
nonetheless be leveraged at the outset of a long-contract program by presenting potential recruits 
with positive comments participants have made about the program, especially at places like 
Fanjingshan with large populations of current enrollees. 
Results also provide insight into which households should be approached by PES 
administrators to increase the efficiency of recruitment. The most likely participants are more 
newly established households that have local off-farm income sources, no livestock, and older or 
less-educated heads. Targeting these households may produce a greater return on administrators’ 
efforts and secure sufficient participation without needing to greatly adjust the payments or other 
terms in the contract. Further, the positive relationship between perceived social norms and PES 
enrollment also supports Narloch et al.’s (2009) suggestion that new norms can develop that 
encourage PES enrollment for the common good, thereby improving environmental protection in 
ways that are not completely dependent on sustained incentives. This finding may thus quell 
fears that PES will degrade environmental protection by tying it too directly to incentives as 
landholders at Fanjingshan appear motivated by the social norms of land management to a 
similar extent to which they are motivated by financial offerings. However, this conclusion 
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should not be extrapolated freely to other regions; PES is less likely to degrade environmental 
ethics in communities where environmentalism is relatively low (Van Hecken & Bastiaensen 
2010), which is the case in much of rural China (Yu 2014). Such degradation of nonfinancial 
motives may well be significant in communities with long-standing systems of collectivist 
conservation. 
This study offers a rare empirical demonstration of the relationship between social norms 
and PES enrollment, revealing considerable potential for program recruiters to improve 
enrollment by emphasizing existing community buy-in and creating opportunities for enrollees 
and supporters to interact with those yet undecided. Results provide a relatively comprehensive 
illustration of who is likely to enroll in GTGP, providing insight for recruitment into this and 
other PES programs operating in the developing world. It also strengthens the case for the role of 
off-farm income on PES enrollment in poor communities, introduces a negative effect of lifetime 
residence within a neighborhood, and presents an unusual finding that education can decrease 
propensity to enroll under these cultural and socioeconomic circumstances. These insights may 
help PES administrators improve financial efficiency by using social norms in conjunction with 
monetary payments to incentivize enrollment and to improve bureaucratic efficiency by helping 
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CHAPTER 3: DIVERGENT IMPACTS OF THE GRAIN TO GREEN 
PROGRAM, LANDHOLDINGS, AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS ON LIVELIHOOD 
DIVERSIFICATION IN RURAL CHINA 
 
China’s ambitious Grain to Green Program (GTGP) pays farmers to retire ecologically 
vulnerable cropland in pursuit of two goals: environmental recovery and economic 
diversification. While there is compelling evidence that GTGP has promoted off-farm 
employment in a broad sense, little is known about what types of work participants take and 
whether these labor transfers will continue after payments expire. Studies also tend to focus on 
livelihood diversification through urban migration while ignoring the nuances of the local job 
market. Rooted in a “labor-increasing” versus “labor-decreasing” framework, this study finds 
divergent effects of GTGP across local employment sectors. While GTGP facilitates 
nonagricultural employment, it also acts as a probably-temporary replacement for agricultural 
jobs and does not significantly encourage entrepreneurship, which may hinder post-program 
retirement of cropland. Results also show cropland holdings, household size, gender, marital 
status, and especially education are influential predictors of labor allocation, suggesting the 
parcels most likely to remain retired long-term belong to male-headed households with fewer, 
better-educated members including unmarried young people. In addition, there is much space to 
improve GTGP’s income-diversifying effects by improving access to education and 
incorporating concrete supports and incentives for non-farm employment pursuits and small-




Despite the country’s legendary economic boom, China’s development has been 
overwhelmingly two-track. While the urban half of China’s population experiences 
unprecedented modernization and wealth-building, life for the 590 million rural dwellers (Wang 
et al. 2019; Long 2014) is still marked by poverty (Liu et al. 2014) as the gap between rural and 
urban income widens (Shi et al. 2007). This issue is further complicated by poverty-environment 
“contradictions,” wherein poverty puts pressure on local natural resources which in turn 
exacerbates poverty, while efforts to regulate these resources easily flounder (Liu & Lan 2015). 
Rural China thus faces a crisis of both stubborn poverty and environmental degradation, and the 
central government, like many around the world, have attempted to resolve both through 
integrated policy interventions. The most extensive of these has been the Grain to Green 
Program, a payment for ecosystem services (PES) program introduced in 1999.  
In the global push for environmentally-beneficial poverty alleviation (UNDP 2005), PES 
has emerged as a promising, albeit expensive, means to both ends. Through PES, landholders 
receive financial incentives for managing their land in ways that promote ecosystem service 
production (Engel et al. 2008), with many programs aiming to enroll poorer households (Blundo-
Canto et al. 2018). Because agricultural land is managed at the household level in most countries 
(Wang et al. 2019), these programs’ influence on household-level resource decisions has 
potential to produce extensive results in the aggregate, and because the rural poor tend to occupy 
mountainous and other ecologically fragile environments (Kelly & Huo 2013), these programs 
may help the most vulnerable people and ecosystems simultaneously. The economic theory 
behind PES is straightforward; resource-use decisions on-farm produce externalities off-farm; 
PES internalizes these effects through explicit incentives (Blundo-Canto et al. 2018) while 
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allowing often-poor landholders to capture more value from environmental services (Barbier et 
al. 2010). Several programs have demonstrated success in influencing land cover (Pagiola et al. 
2007; Arriagada et al. 2012; Jayachandran et al. 2017), especially increasing forest land (Barbier 
et al. 2010). However, PES operates on limited-term contracts, and these land use changes may 
easily revert when payments expire (Pattanayak et al. 2010). Still, many PES scholars and 
practitioners argue environmental benefits are likely to continue post-program if agricultural 
households have transitioned permanently into other jobs (Kelly & Huo 2013; Uchida et al. 
2009). Because rural livelihood diversification also tends to alleviate poverty, this is a desirable 
outcome in terms of both the environmental and social objectives of PES (Liu & Lan 2015). 
Unfortunately, this kind of transition requires a well-functioning labor market farmers can easily 
access, which is rare in developing countries (Groom et al. 2010). It is thus essential to 
understand barriers to the labor market and which households need additional support or 
incentives to obtain off-farm work. 
Policy evaluation has traditionally treated households within a community as 
homogeneous, which is likely to produce flawed recommendations regarding the relationship 
between PES and the labor market (Groom et al. 2010). PES’s effects on household income 
diversification are heterogeneous (Liu & Lan 2015), and farm and household characteristics also 
affect decisions regarding off-farm labor allocation (Shi et al. 2007). Diversification can also be 
constrained by limited education, skills, and financial capital, any of which may be ameliorated 
by policy interventions (Liu & Lan 2015). Education is an especially critical consideration; more 
educated workers’ participation in the off-farm labor market has grown more than their less 
educated counterparts’ (Zhang et al. 2002), and education is increasingly creating better returns 
for workers (Zhang et al. 2008; Zhang et al. 2002). Prior evidence has suggested the effects of 
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education, gender, and marital status differ (Shi et al. 2007), but research that differentiates the 
effects of demographics on different employment types (e.g. agricultural wage work, 
nonagricultural wage work, and self-employment/entrepreneurship) is extremely limited.    
China’s Grain to Green Program (GTGP) presents a valuable opportunity to understand 
rural livelihood diversification in the context of PES. The largest PES program in the developing 
world (Yin et al. 2013), GTGP aims to convert and protect mountainous landscapes while 
diversifying the rural labor force (Uchida et al. 2009). Several studies have argued GTGP 
promotes off-farm labor (Uchida et al. 2009; Uchida et al. 2007; Liu & Lan 2015; Yin et al. 
2014a), although these effects are locally heterogeneous (Liu & Lan 2015), reflecting differing 
household-level constraints to participation (Groom et al. 2010). Creating more universal 
livelihood diversification in rural China requires greater understanding of why farmers seek off-
farm jobs and what policy interventions may facilitate the transition. Unfortunately, most studies 
have taken a homogenized approach, lumping all types of off-farm work together (Kelly & Huo 
2014; Liu & Lan 2015; Li et al. 2011; Uchida et al. 2009). This ignores the potentially divergent 
impacts of various work types on a household’s long-term livelihood portfolio, some of which 
may retain farmers’ labor allocation post-PES, while others may not. While some farmers, 
especially those who find relatively lucrative or comfortable off-farm jobs, may decide not to 
return to cultivation, others may be eager to direct their efforts back to cultivation when PES 
payments expire. This also prevents exploration of any effects of during-program diversification 
on a household or community’s human capital, which may hinder or promote further economic 
diversification and development. For example, farmers who turn their attention to small-scale 
entrepreneurship or nonagricultural jobs develop new, profitable skills that agricultural wage 
workers may not. Because long-term cropland retirement requires enough nonagricultural jobs to 
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attract and absorb the displaced workforce in perpetuity, differentiating among employment 
types will help PES administrators predict whether cropland will stay retired post-program.  
Set at Fanjingshan National Nature Reserve in Guizhou Province, this study uses household 
survey data for each year from 2000 to 2014 in a random effects model to evaluate the program’s 
effect on labor allocation. It abandons the notion of “off-farm work” as a cohesive category and 
differentiates among four occupation types: on-farm (i.e. one’s own household’s land), 
agricultural wage work (i.e. on another household’s land), nonagricultural wage work, and self-
employment/entrepreneurship. It also rejects the assumption that any labor freed up by PES in 
this developing-world context will be redirected elsewhere. Results will provide a more detailed 
illustration of how PES diversifies the rural workforce, the effects on participants’ day-to-day 
lives, and whether and when these transitions and subsequent cropland retirement can be 
expected to outlast PES contracts. This will illuminate key opportunities for policy interventions 
that alleviate constraints on off-farm livelihood activities and encourage more permanent 
cropland retirement and economic diversity. 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Study Site 
Fanjingshan National Nature Reserve (N27º44’42”—28º03’11”, W108º34’19” –
108º48’30”) is located in northeastern Guizhou Province, southwestern China. Since its 
establishment in 1978, the reserve has attracted attention from conservationists globally and is 
inside one of the world’s 25 “biodiversity hotspots” (Myers et al. 2000). The 419-km2 site is 
home to about 13,000 people, most of whom are subsistence farmers, although some have 
migrated to cities for work or found employment in the area’s tourism sector. However, 
economic benefit from tourism is uneven and concentrated near accessible areas, especially since 
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the installation of a tourist-friendly cable car system in 2009 (Aitken & An 2012). Residents 
represent the Han majority and several ethnic minority groups (Wandersee et al. 2012). As in 
many other mountainous regions inhabited primarily by subsistence farmers, the area has been 
involved in GTGP since 2000. Many (774) of the area’s approximately 5,000 households are 
enrolled in the GTGP, receiving an average of 556 USD per ha per year. Through GTGP, the 
local government has provided farmers with seedlings of pine, Chinese fir, bamboo, and other 
species native to the region’s natural evergreen, deciduous, and mixed broadleaf forests. The 
second round of GTGP contracts began in 2008 and expired in 2017; data were collected in 2014 
when farmers were deciding whether to recommit to or exit the program. 
3.2.2 Data and Analysis 
In-person interviews were conducted with households in a stratified random sample. 
Based on a 2013 census that had identified 3,256 households, 1160 households were selected in 
hopes of obtaining 650 usable interviews after eliminating households with no knowledgeable 
member present due to travel or other circumstances. The 3256 households were divided into 
123 sampling units; 58 of these units were selected and assigned to 20 administrative villages in 
proportion to each village’s population size. This produced a slight overrepresentation of smaller 
villages. In total, 20 households were selected from each administrative village per sampling 
unit; 1160 households were ultimately selected, and full surveys were completed for 605 
households in 2014. Details are available at http://complexities.org/pes/research/recent-updates. 
The household head was interviewed when possible; otherwise any other available, 
knowledgeable adult was interviewed. These interviews covered household demographics, work 
and migration history, participation in GTGP, agricultural activities and holdings, and other 
topics related to livelihood and lifestyle. For each household, one in-depth life history table was 
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taken for one adult who belonged to the household in 2004 and had never migrated. These 
household members were selected based on a priority hierarchy (Appendix A). For each year 
between 2000 and 2014, the household respondent indicated the household’s size, the person’s 
age and education level, and whether the person worked on-farm, worked on another’s farm, did 
nonagricultural work off-farm, or ran a small business that year. Invariant demographic 
characteristics (e.g. gender) were collected earlier in the survey. Data were collected only for 
years when the person was over age 15; prior years were left blank. This left the dataset with 
8,421 binary observations per occupation for 583 individuals with a mean 14.4 observations 
(years) per individual. GTGP status was controlled for using the earliest year the household had 
enrolled in GTGP; that year and subsequent years were considered “enrolled.” Data were 
analyzed via separate binary logistic regressions in random effects models at the individual level: 
working on one’s own farm (henceforth “on-farm”), working on another household’s farm 
(henceforth “agricultural wage work”), working a nonagricultural job, or entrepreneurship/self-
employment. It was possible for a person to hold more than one of these occupations in the same 
year as local wage employment or entrepreneurship can easily occur alongside on-farm work 
(Shi et al. 2007). Control variables that varied by year included age, education level, household 
size, and GTGP enrollment. Time-invariant control variables included gender and agricultural 
land area. 580 usable non-migrant personal histories were completed. 29 of these households 
(4.97%) had no agricultural land; three households (0.52%) had more than two hectares; these 32 
households were removed from analysis to eliminate the effect of on-farm work being a non-
option and to avoid outlier influence. Further, because the distribution of cropland area was 





Summary statistics are listed in Table 3.1. Demographic and household characteristics 
were relatively consistent between those enrolled in GTGP in a given year and those not 
enrolled. GTGP enrollees had a mean age of 47.9 years (SD 13.5), 5.03 years of education (SD 
3.62), household size of 3.63 members (SD 1.94) and 0.434 ha agricultural land (SD 0.361). 
68.1% of this group worked on their own household’s farms in the average year; 3.8% worked 
on other households’ farms; 31.2% engaged in nonagricultural work; 7.3% ran a small business, 
and 1.6% were in school. Non-enrollees had a mean age of 44.4 years (SD 14.1), 4.65 years of 
education (SD 3.51), household size of 3.73 members (SD 1.80) and 0.355 ha agricultural land 
(SD 0.364). 76.0% of this group worked on their own household’s farms in the average year; 
7.7% worked on other households’ farms; 35.5% engaged in nonagricultural work, and 6.8% ran 
a small business. Two-sample proportion tests showed the only two variables that differed 
significantly between enrolled and non-enrolled households (p<0.05) were marital status and 
cropland area. 
 
Table 3.1. Summary statistics by GTGP status (in 2014) 
Variable Mean (in 
GTGP) 
SD Mean (not in 
GTGP) 
SD 
Age*** 53.1 13.2 51.9 14.5 
Education (years) 4.94 3.66 4.67 3.49 
Female (1=yes) 0.224  0.230  
Ever married (1=yes)** 0.961  0.910  
Household size 3.22 1.70 3.35 1.71 
Cropland area (ha)** 0.406 0.277 0.354 0.302 
Worked on-farm** 0.692  0.789  
Worked on another farm 0.053  0.089  
Nonagricultural work** 0.294  0.201  
Self-employment 0.114  0.098  
Observations 314  232  
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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 GTGP enrollment was negatively associated with working on-farm and working on 
others’ farms (agricultural wage work). It decreased the odds of working on one’s own farm by a 
factor of 0.407 (p<0.01) and doing agricultural wage work by a factor of 0.226 (p<0.01). GTGP 
enrollment doubled the odds of working off-farm jobs (increased by a factor of 2.18; p<0.01), 
but did not significantly influence the odds of self-employment. Age was at least marginally 
correlated with all types of work; older individuals were more likely to work on their own farms, 
on others’ farms, or in self-employment, but less likely to have nonagricultural wage work. 
Education decreased the odds of working on one’s own farm but increased the odds of 
nonagricultural wage work or self-employment; it was uncorrelated with agricultural wage work. 
Women were substantially less likely to work nonagricultural wage jobs but gender did not 
appear to influence other work types. Married individuals were less likely to work on-farm, work 
on another farm, or be self-employed, but were substantially more likely to hold nonagricultural 
jobs. Being a member of a larger household increased the odds of working on-farm, marginally 
decreased the odds of doing agricultural wage work, and increased the odds of being self-
employed; it had no significant effect on nonfarm wage work. Those whose households held 
more cropland were more likely to work on-farm and at least marginally less likely to have any 
other type of work including agricultural wage work, especially nonagricultural. Table 3.2 and 
Figure 3.1 summarize odds ratios for these variables. Overall, the most likely to work on-farm 
were those who were older, less educated, unmarried, and belonged to larger households with 
more cropland and no involvement with GTGP. The most likely to do agricultural wage work on 
others’ farms were older adults belonging to households with more people, less cropland, and no 
involvement in GTGP. The most likely to work nonagricultural wage jobs were younger, more 
educated, married adults whose households had less cropland and were enrolled in GTGP. 
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Similarly, the most likely to be self-employed were older, more educated adults whose 
households were GTGP-enrolled and had less cropland and more people. 
 
Table 3.2. Logistic regression results: Odds ratios. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. 
Variable On-farm Other farm Nonag. Self-employ. 
GTGP 0.408*** 0.226*** 2.177*** 2.093 
 (0.272, 0.612) (0.098, 0.525) (1.441, 3.288) (0.739, 5.928) 
Age 1.042*** 1.180*** 0.960* 1.338*** 
 (1.018, 1.068) (0.128, 0.236) (0.936, 0.984) (1.266, 1.414) 
Education  0.534*** 0.952 2.069*** 2.310*** 
 (0.459, 0.622) (0.763, 1.187) (1.781, 2.404) (1.768, 3.018) 
Female  2.292 1.826 0.137*** 2.329 
 (0.700, 7.500) (0.369, 9.046) (0.035, 0.372) (0.224, 24.17) 
Married  0.410*** 0.312* 4.637*** 0.142*** 
 (0.212, 0.795) (0.085, 1.148) (2.337, 7.236) (0.043, 0.470) 
HH size 1.555*** 1.189* 0.934* 1.900*** 
 (1.377, 1.755) (0.987, 1.432) (0.843, 1.035) (1.516, 2.382) 
Log-cropland  5.82*** 0.475* 0.109*** 0.421* 
 (1.964, 50.25) (0.209, 1.080) (0.154, 0.517) (0.154, 1.151) 
Obs. (Groups) 7514 (532) 7506 (532) 7533 (534) 7532 (534) 
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Evidence suggests GTGP produces disparate effects on off-farm employment based 
partly on desirability of the work. It was associated with lesser likelihood of working in 
agriculture (whether on one’s own farm or another household’s) and greater likelihood of 
nonagricultural employment, which corroborates a few studies that have deemed the program a 
moderate success in diversifying the rural labor force (Kelly & Huo 2013; Uchida et al. 2009) 
but contradicts a few studies that have failed to find an effect on labor transfer (Li et al. 2011; 
Uchida et al. 2007), at least when controlling for preexisting assets (Liang et al. 2012).  Liu & 
Lan (2015) and Uchida et al. (2009) both argue this diversification is due to the fact GTGP’s 
cash payments reduce liquidity constraints, which is especially important given the high 
transaction costs that often inhibit rural households from accessing off-farm labor markets 
(Groom et al. 2010). GTGP can also facilitate the pursuit of nonagricultural work by freeing up 
time, as managing GTGP-enrolled parcels requires less labor than cultivating would (Uchida et 
al. 2007). Despite the positive effect of GTGP on nonagricultural employment, agricultural wage 
work exhibited the opposite effect wherein GTGP enrollees were less likely to engage. I 
hypothesize this is due to two related but conflicting forces on PES recipients’ labor allocation. 
The labor-increasing effect occurs when PES households reallocate their freed-up labor to other 
activities to maximize total income, whereas the labor-decreasing effect occurs when households 
already have their needs met to the point where they can allocate at least some of this freed-up 
time to leisure (Uchida et al. 2009; Uchida et al. 2007). The labor-increasing effect is more 
common in developing countries because poorer households have a higher marginal utility of 
income (Uchida et al. 2009), whereas the labor-decreasing effect has been observed in American 
households enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program. While Uchida et al.’s (2009) study 
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contrasted these two effects between vastly different development and cultural contexts (i.e. rural 
United States and rural China), this study finds these effects concurring in a single, small region, 
which highlights the need to de-homogenize how we investigate and discuss rural income 
diversification especially in the context of PES. It appears workers with agricultural wage jobs 
experience the labor-decreasing effect, using PES payments to replace these jobs likely because 
they are less lucrative and more physically demanding, without necessarily looking for other 
work to replace it. Farming one’s own land produces low marginal returns in China (Knight & 
Song 2003), and working for wages on another household’s farm is presumably less lucrative 
assuming it leaves a profit margin for the employer. If agricultural wage workers are, in fact, 
experiencing the labor-decreasing effect, this may bode poorly for the fates of GTGP lands after 
payments end. The success of GTGP largely depends on a permanent labor transition away from 
agriculture so households do not re-cultivate these parcels to replace the expired subsidies 
(Uchida et al. 2009). If agricultural wage workers are suspending some of their labor during the 
payment period rather than putting more effort into their off-farm jobs (agricultural wage work 
or otherwise), they are likely to revert to their pre-program activities after payments end out of 
necessity; this includes resuming cultivation on their own land and removing GTGP plantings. 
However, this alleged labor-decreasing effect may in fact be a precursor to the labor-increasing 
effect. GTGP households with agricultural wage workers may be using the relaxed liquidity 
constraints as an opportunity to pursue more lucrative, nonagricultural jobs, perhaps by investing 
in education or training. If this is the case, then these workers may not be more likely than their 
nonagricultural counterparts to re-cultivate at the end of the term. And because agricultural 
workers are among the lowest earners, this may suggest GTGP is achieving its pro-poor 
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objectives by helping the poorest households diversify and improve their income portfolios long-
term. 
In theory, by relaxing financial constraints (Liu & Lan 2015; Uchida et al. 2009), GTGP 
should facilitate entrepreneurship (Mohapatra et al. 2007; Demurger et al. 2010), but this study 
found no significant effect of GTGP on self-employment. This is similar to Liu & Lan’s (2015) 
finding that GTGP participants and nonparticipants were similarly likely to be self-employed, 
while other studies on GTGP’s impact on off-farm employment have not separated self-
employment from wage employment (Lin & Yao 2014; Liang et al. 2012; Uchida et al. 2009). 
Although self-employment is one of the strongest employment trends in rural China (Mohapatra 
et al. 2007) and a goal associated with GTGP, there is no concrete investment that ties 
environmental programs to entrepreneurship (Zhang et al. 2008). If program coordinators want to 
use GTGP to promote entrepreneurship, it may be necessary to incorporate additional support or 
incentives for GTGP participants who start small businesses.  
While GTGP enrollment was influential, coefficients suggest cropland area was also a 
powerful factor in determining which sector an individual worked in. Individuals whose 
households had more cropland were far more likely to work on-farm and less likely to work 
nonagricultural jobs; they were marginally less likely to work on other farms or be self-
employed. This result fits well with existing theory on labor in rural China; land is scarce and 
farms are small, forcing many households to find supplementary income (Shi et al. 2007; Zhang 
& Li 2003). Jia & Petrick (2014) found a similar result when they tested this effect at the village 
level and found villages with lower land available per capital had larger off-farm labor forces. 
Beyond the simple interpretation that larger landholdings leave more to cultivate after GTGP 
restrictions are in place, this may be an expression of the labor-increasing effect where 
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participants with more land are using payments to improve income and diversity on-farm by 
investing in equipment or training (Shi et al. 2007). More land can allow households to diversify 
their agricultural activities (Demurger et al. 2010), and it has been shown that the surplus labor 
created by GTGP is sometimes absorbed by intensified cultivation on remaining land (Li et al. 
2015). This finding may affect post-program land use in either direction; on one hand, those with 
ample land and improved per-hectare production may be less inclined to remove GTGP plantings 
for re-cultivation; on the other hand, these households are the least likely to shift labor off-farm 
during the program, let alone permanently. If the former is true, program administrators may 
improve long-term environmental results (and lower transaction costs) by targeting larger 
landholders, although this may favor wealthier households (Wegner 2016). If it is the latter, the 
program may fare better by targeting smaller landholders who will be more inclined to shift their 
livelihood strategies away from agriculture in a way that is conducive to program goals.  
Age was another variable that impacted every type of work. Older respondents were more 
likely to work on-farm, work on another farm, or run a business. While counterintuitive given the 
physical demands of agriculture, the positive correlation between age and farm work has been 
observed before (Zhang & Zhang 2002; Shi et al.2007). Evidence from Israel suggests farmers 
sometimes revert to on-farm work later in life (Shi et al. 2007), especially when they have adult 
children (Kimhi 2004). In China, older adults are also more likely to be laid off during economic 
recessions (Zhang et al. 2002), perhaps necessitating on-farm work. The marginal negative 
relationship between age and nonagricultural wage employment is also consistent with other 
studies (Huang et al. 2009; Kelly & Huo 2014); this may be due to age discrimination, evidenced 
by older adults’ higher layoff rates (Zhang et al. 2002), reluctance to change occupations late in 
life, or because the education they received in youth was less applicable to the modern off-farm 
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job market. While it is tempting to conclude targeting younger farmers for GTGP contracts 
would produce the best long-term results because they are more likely to transfer their labor 
permanently, Chen et al. (2009) provided strong empirical evidence that older adults are less 
likely to reconvert GTGP parcels when contracts expire, suggesting on-farm workers may 
nevertheless be safe bets for long-term PES results if they are older. 
Education was an intuitive predictor of labor allocation; it decreased on-farm work and 
increased nonagricultural work and entrepreneurship. Earnings from on-farm work are generally 
lower than those from nonagricultural work (Cook 1999), and because the market for 
nonagricultural jobs can be competitive and require certain skills, better-educated individuals are 
more likely to secure them (Shi et al. 2007). In addition to wage work, education can provide the 
managerial skills needed for successful self-employment (Shi et al. 2007), as demonstrated by 
Mohapatra et al.’s (2007) study of the growing trend of self-employment in rural China. The 
advantage education provides is growing (Zhang et al. 2002); Zhang et al. (2008) estimate rates 
of return at 3.2% per year of pre-high school education and 11.8% in high school and beyond. 
This suggests considerable room to increase off-farm labor at Fanjingshan by improving access 
to education, as the average person in our study came in well below the high school threshold at 
five years of schooling. As average education increases due to compulsory eighth-grade 
education implemented in 1986 (Fan et al. 2004), the dynamics between educational attainment 
and PES enrollment may become less of a bottleneck factor. Although education discouraged 
work on one’s own farm, it had no significant effect on agricultural wage work. However, 
agriculture absorbs surplus labor from other sectors during economic downturns, and because 
less educated individuals are more likely to be laid off during these times (Zhang et al. 2002), a 
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negative correlation between education and agricultural wage work may emerge in times of 
recession. 
Gender was a significant predictor only for nonagricultural wage work, which men were 
more likely to do. This is a typical trend (Demurger et al. 2010; Shi et al. 2007; Kelly & Huo 
2014; Mohapatra et al. 2006; Shi et al. 2007; Matthews & Nee 2000), likely because women are 
more often responsible for household and childrearing tasks (Shi et al. 2007; Matthews & Nee 
2000). Gender did not significantly affect agricultural work, whether on-farm or wage work, nor 
did it affect entrepreneurship. Although the lack of relationship between gender and agricultural 
work is not out of line with theory amid debate over whether or not China’s agricultural sector is 
“feminizing” (Chang 2011), most other studies have found men are more likely to be self-
employed (Mohapatra et al. 2006; Entwisle et al. 1995; Zhang et al. 2006). The correlation may 
be absent here due to local cultural differences or men’s greater propensity to find wage work 
(Yost et al. 2020). Meanwhile, having been married encouraged nonagricultural work while 
discouraging on-farm work, entrepreneurship, and marginally, agricultural wage work. Prior 
studies have shown men are more likely to engage in off-farm wage work if they are married 
(Qiao et al. 2015; Hare 1994) and women if they are single (Hare 2004; Cook 1998), perhaps 
because household labor divisions leave women with household tasks and childrearing 
(Matthews & Nee 2000) while men are freer to pursue off-farm work (Zhang & Li 2003). 
Because 79% of our sample were men, it is reasonable that the impact of marriage on 
nonagricultural work would be positive overall. Still, Zhang et al. (2008) found marriage had an 
overall negative impact on obtaining off-farm employment and a few studies have found a 
positive effect of marriage on off-farm employment among rural Chinese women (Qiao et al. 
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2015; Hare 1999), suggesting the relationship between marital status and off-farm work is not 
straightforward and perhaps inconsistent across geographic contexts. 
Household size was positively correlated with both types of agricultural labor and with 
entrepreneurship. Its correlation with on-farm work is counterintuitive given farmland’s limited 
labor absorption capacity, but it may reflect intensified cultivation (Li et al. 2015) to increase 
food production, especially given the largely subsistence nature of this region’s agricultural 
sector. The positive influence of household size on agricultural wage work, however, is intuitive 
because agricultural jobs tend to absorb excess labor capacity (Zhang et al. 2002), especially 
workers who lack the education to thrive in the nonagricultural job market. Further, larger 
households have a higher marginal utility of income (Woldehanna & Lansink 2000), providing 
more motivation to take on less-desirable agricultural work, whether on one’s own farm or off. 
Meanwhile larger households may be more likely to run small businesses to absorb excess labor 
within the household, and may be better able to afford the risk when there are enough laborers 
working on-farm to maintain production. Our results found no significant link between 
household size and nonagricultural wage employment, which reflects the conflict among the few 
studies that have tried to find one. Yin et al. (2018) found larger households had lower off-farm 
income; these authors were surprised by the link but conjectured this was because larger families 
had more limited capital to overcome the transaction costs of the labor market. Any relationship 
between household size and nonagricultural employment may also be weak because a larger 
household does not necessarily mean more laborers; it may include children or elders whose at-
home care restricts their caretakers’ ability to take on scheduled wage work away from home. 
Given larger households’ propensity to keep their labor in agriculture, and their propensity to 
reconvert GTGP plots to agriculture when contracts expire (Chen et al. 2009), it appears GTGP 
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will be less successful diversifying their livelihoods long-term. Administrators may thus be wise 
to target smaller households for future enrollment. 
This study provides the first empirical demonstration of how PES diversifies household 
income across multiple sectors. Results confirm GTGP is a catalyst for nonagricultural 
employment but a perhaps-temporary substitute for agricultural wage work, which may need to 
resume when payments expire. There is considerable room to advance the program’s goal of 
permanent cropland retirement through economic diversification by improving access to 
education and offering explicit incentives, training, or transportation assistance for off-farm job 
searches and entrepreneurship, especially for women and those with lower educational 
attainment. Absent these structural interventions, GTGP administrators may improve results of 
future contracts by targeting households most likely to transition their labor off-farm 
permanently, especially those with smaller landholdings, fewer and better-educated members, 
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CHAPTER 4: SYNTHESIZING REMOTE SENSING AND BIOPHYSICAL 
MEASURES TO EVALUATE HUMAN–WILDLIFE CONFLICTS: THE CASE OF 
WILD BOAR CROP RAIDING IN RURAL CHINA 
 
Crop raiding by wild boars is a growing problem worldwide with potentially damaging 
consequences for rural dwellers’ cooperation with conservation policies. Still, limited resources 
inhibit continuous monitoring, and there is uncertainty about the relationship between the 
biophysical realities of crop raiding and humans’ perceptions and responses. By integrating data 
from camera traps, remote sensors, and household surveys, this study establishes an empirical 
model of wild boar population density that can be applied to multiple years to estimate changes 
in distribution over time. It also correlates historical estimates of boar population distribution 
with human-reported trends to support the model’s validity and assess local perceptions of crop 
raiding. Although the model proved useful in coniferous and bamboo forests, it is less useful in 
mixed broadleaf, evergreen broadleaf, and deciduous forests. Results also show alignment 
between perceptions of crop raiding and actual boar populations, corroborating farmers’ 
perceptions which are increasingly dismissed as a less reliable source of information in human–
wildlife conflict research. The modeling techniques demonstrated here may provide conservation 
practitioners with a cost-effective way to maintain up-to-date estimates of the spatial distribution 
of wild boar and resultant crop raiding. 
4.1 Introduction 
Human–wildlife conflict is an increasingly prevalent challenge throughout the world, with 
potentially severe implications for environmental conservation (Dickman 2010). These conflicts 
are centered on competing social and environmental values, and while research cannot point to 
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“correct” solutions, it can help conservation managers predict potential conflicts prior to policy 
implementation and manage them accordingly. Human–wildlife conflict is a special concern in 
protected areas and their surroundings. As ecosystems recover, growing populations of some 
wildlife species can threaten the livelihoods and safety of nearby rural communities (Distefano 
2005), especially when these species invade farm fields and devour crops. Not only does crop 
raiding bring economic hardship to already poor families (Linkie et al. 2007) and contribute to 
food shortages (Mojo et al. 2014), it can also breed resistance to conservation programs (Nyhus 
& Tilson 2000) and interfere with their outcomes (Linkie et al. 2007). Managing wildlife crop 
raiding is thus socially and environmentally vital. While there have been several studies on crop 
raiding near protected areas (Nyhus & Tilson 2000; Wang et al. 2010; Cai et al. 2008; Ango et 
al. 2014), few have examined how crop raiding changes over time, likely because field estimates 
are expensive to obtain (McDermid et al. 2009). 
Crucial to the management of human–wildlife conflict is understanding the habitat and 
distribution of the wildlife species in question. Remotely sensed imagery, especially those from 
the Landsat satellite series, have long been used to estimate wildlife distribution and habitat 
suitability due to their cost-free accessibility (Szantoi et al. 2017; Viña et al. 2008) and their 
ability to cover large spatial extents (Ackers et al. 2015). While several studies have 
simultaneously considered different topographic, hydrologic, and human variables (De Leeuw et 
al. 2002), vegetation characteristics remain keystone explanatory variables, usually measured 
through remotely derived vegetation indices such as the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index 
(NDVI) (Simons-Legaard et al. 2016; De Leeuw et al. 2002). In addition, strategies for 
interpreting results vary, with some studies assigning ordinal suitability ratings ranging from 
“low” to “very good” (Porwal et al. 1996), while others use a continuous suitability scale 
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(Schairer et al. 1999), and then establish a threshold to determine whether a species is potentially 
“present” or “absent” at a site (Pearce 2000). All these models are empirical, requiring on-the-
ground population measurements to calibrate the relationships between environmental 
characteristics and actual wildlife occurrences and distribution. Ground-measurements are 
increasingly being done using noninvasive camera traps (Cove et al. 2013; Massei et al. 2018), 
although different population distribution indicators have also been employed (Viña et al. 2008; 
Massei et al. 2018). 
While many studies that model species distribution using remotely sensed data are 
undertaken to aid conservation of vulnerable/endangered species (Bechtel et al. 2004; McDermid 
et al. 2009), comparatively few address relationships between economically vulnerable human 
populations and highly resilient and pervasive wildlife species such as wild boars (Sus scrofa). 
As in many places around the world, forest recovery in China has brought a resurgence of wild 
boars, especially near protected areas (Sekhar 1998), which often has severe economic 
consequences for farmers, many of whom are poor. In China, this is even more problematic 
because killing or trapping wild animals is restricted in many places, while alternative methods 
to control crop raiding, such as fencing, have proven ineffectual. Due to their dense populations, 
adaptable diets, large bodies, and high reproduction rates, it is difficult to control wild boar 
populations and/or mitigate their damage to crops (Cai et al. 2008). Growth in wild boar 
populations has even induced cropland abandonment, as is the case in the mountainous 
Chongqing Province (Hua et al. 2016), and the problem may be growing in other areas where 
conservation policies bring increasing forest cover that allows wild boar populations to flourish. 
This poses a threat to any further conservation action, and data from other regions (e.g., Tianma 
National Nature Reserve) suggest that these losses offset the social benefits of even voluntary 
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conservation programs (Chen et al. 2019). Thus, understanding the distribution of wild boars and 
crop raiding will improve our ability to assess their burdens to farmers, land-use practices in 
response to these burdens, and overall long-term dynamics of local ecosystems. 
When creating habitat models, it is critical to consider several variables that affect the 
species’ key needs: space, cover, and food. Prior studies have suggested that wild boars prefer 
deciduous forests in southern Sweden (Thurfjell et al. 2009) and deciduous or coniferous forests 
in South Korea (Park & Lee 2003), although there may be wide regional differences for this 
extremely widespread species (Liu et al. 2017); thus it is necessary to perform site-specific 
evaluations. Elevation is also a key habitat variable, as lower elevations may provide steadier 
year-round feeding opportunities, as evidenced by studies in the United States which show that 
some boars remain at lower elevations while others shift to feed at higher elevations during 
summer (Keuling et al. 2009). Meanwhile boars may tolerate steep terrains and in fact be drawn 
to them when they provide a protective barrier against threats (Anderson et al. 1993). 
Furthermore, because slope aspect can influence vegetation through its effects on soil moisture 
availability (De Leeuw et al. 2002), aspect values may be reclassified on a scale of 0 to 20 based 
on Parker’s (1982) topographic relative moisture index (TRMI), which estimates relative soil 
moisture based on direction land is sloping. Park and Lee (2003) found that east- and southeast-
facing slopes were most suitable to wild boars in South Korea, which corresponds to low-to-
moderate relative soil moisture values based on the TRMI conversion. Preference for east-facing 
slopes may also occur because these areas are less likely to be covered by forage-inhibiting snow 
during the winter months (Rho 2015), and thus may also exhibit lower soil moistures during 
spring and summer. 
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The triadic relationship among farmers, wild boars, and forest growth has been reported by a 
few studies using empirical data collected within a single season (Linkie et al. 2007; Cai et al. 
2008; Thapa et al. 2010). This study integrates biophysical and socioeconomic data to illustrate a 
system in rural China wherein impoverished, small-scale farmers are subjected to an increase in 
crop losses due to foraging wild boar, a species that stands to flourish amid the region’s forest 
gains, over a period of 26 years from August 1990 to August 2016. Results of this study may 
provide a cost-effective way to evaluate long-term socioeconomic effects of successful forest 
conservation programs, help with the development of appropriate mitigation and compensation 
programs, and further enhance the long-term success of conservation actions. 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Study Site 
Fanjingshan National Nature Reserve (N 27°44′42′′–28°03′11′′, W 108°34′19′′–
108°48′30′′) is located in northeastern Guizhou Province, southwestern China. Since its 
establishment in 1978, the reserve has attracted attention from conservationists globally and is 
inside one of the world’s 25 biodiversity hotspots (Myers et al. 2000). The mountainous 419-km2 
site is dominated by evergreen, deciduous, and mixed broadleaf forests with tracts of bamboo. 
Elevation varies widely from 400 m to 2560 m. The site is also home to about 13,000 people, 
most of whom are subsistence farmers, although some have migrated to cities for work or found 
employment in the area’s burgeoning tourism sector (Aitken & An 2012). Human settlements in 
the study area have historically brought instances of both deforestation and reforestation 
(Wandersee et al. 2012). As in many other mountainous regions inhabited primarily by 
subsistence farmers, the area has been involved in China’s Grain to Green (GTGP) reforestation 
program since 2000, which aims to provide participants with monetary and/or in-kind payments 
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in return for replacing croplands on steep hillslopes with forestland or grassland (Liu et al. 2008). 
A total of 774 of the area’s approximately 3256 households are enrolled in the program, 
receiving an average of 230 yuan (currently, 1 yuan = 0.14 USD) per mu (15 mu = 1 ha). 
Through GTGP, the local government has provided farmers with seedlings of pine, Chinese fir, 
and other tree species, along with bamboo seedlings. Figure 4.1 contains a true-color aerial 
image of the reserve in August 2016. 
 
Figure 4.1.  True color image of Fanjingshan National Nature Reserve (boundary in white; crop 
fields denoted in yellow points) 
4.2.2 Empirical data 
A time series of Landsat imagery taken on near-anniversary dates covering the study area 
was selected (earthexplorer.usgs.gov; Landsat level-2 product): 22 August 1990, 22 August 
1996, 31 August 2002, 16 August 2011 (Landsat 4/5 TM), and 29 August 2016 (Landsat 8 OLI). 
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These dates were chosen because they provided mostly cloud-free near-anniversary dates during 
summer (Olmanson et al. 2008) at intervals of approximately five years (Jin & Sader 2005). 
Clouds were identified and masked out across the time series using the cloud/quality layer 
provided within the Landsat Level-2 product. A relative atmospheric correction was applied to 
the time series imagery using the empirical line correction (Smith & Milton 1999), pseudo-
invariant targets (i.e., cells whose land cover remained invariant across the time series), and the 
1990 Landsat TM image as the base image. To ensure the integrity of the empirical atmospheric 
correction, pseudo-invariant targets that significantly diverged from the empirical functions were 
removed until each function had R2 values greater than 0.85. Model coefficients obtained for 
these empirical atmospheric corrections are available in Appendix A. The resulting equations 
were then applied to the spectral bands of the other images in the time series. Following this 
radiometric correction, the wide dynamic range vegetation index (WDRVI) was calculated 
across each image in the time series (𝑊𝐷𝑅𝑉𝐼 =  
0.2×𝜌𝑁𝐼𝑅−𝜌𝑟𝑒𝑑
0.2×𝜌𝑁𝐼𝑅+𝜌𝑟𝑒𝑑
). The WDRVI was chosen 
because it is sensitive to variation in greenness values when vegetation density is high, whereas 
other indices saturate (Gitelson 2004). In addition to the Landsat-derived WDRVI, data on 
elevation were also utilized. These data were derived from a digital elevation model obtained by 
the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (earthexplorer.usgs.gov), from which slope and slope 
aspect were calculated. Elevation, slope, and slope aspect were assumed constant throughout the 
time series. 
Data on wild boar populations were obtained using 69 camera traps (Bushnell Trophy Cam) 
deployed between April 2015 and November 2016 throughout the study area (Chen et al. 2020). 
Cameras were placed in each of 71 sampling plots (20 m × 20 m), which had been selected to 
spread across most of the reserve area. In total, 69 of these camera trap placements produced 
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usable observations. While accessibility issues inhibited true random placement, sampling plots 
were selected based on distance to other plots, elevation, and the advice of reserve staff and local 
guides. To fit with the anniversary dates of the Landsat time series, which are ideally collected in 
summer due to the season’s phenological stability (Coppin & Bauer 1996), only camera trap 
observations from summer were used (1 June–31 August). Boar density at each camera trap 
location was estimated by dividing the total number of boars sighted by the number of summer 
days that camera was in operation. To prevent the same boar from being counted more than once 
in rapid succession, it was assumed that a spurt of snapshots captured within 10 min were of the 
same boar unless more than one appeared in a single image. Where there was more than one per 
image, the number of boars was assumed to be the greatest number captured in one image during 
that cluster. A continuous estimate of this proxy for population density was then derived across 
the entire study site using the inverse distance weighting interpolation (IDW) procedure, using 
three different k-values: 1, 2, and 3. This set of k-values is typical in environmental research (Lu 
& Wong 2008) and allowed us to optimize model calibration by selecting the power that 
produced the most transferrable results. This produced three separate surfaces, each estimating 
boar population density across the landscape; k-values refer to the power assigned to each point’s 
distance from the cell in question; when k = 1, the weight would be proportional to the inverse 
distance; when k = 2, the weight would be proportional to the inverse distance-squared, and so on. 
Thus, the surface derived with k = 1 gave the most weight to camera traps farther away and those 





Figure 4.2. IDW interpolated boar density by k-value. 
 
Each camera trap location was also assigned to one of five vegetation classes recorded based 
on in-situ observation: evergreen broadleaf, bamboo, coniferous, mixed broadleaf, and 
deciduous. The camera trap locations were converted to Thiessen polygons to estimate 
vegetation cover across the study area. Camera trap coordinates, dates of operation, and 
vegetation classes are listed in Appendix B. From here, the estimated boar density and vegetation 
type were assigned to each of 1527 agricultural plots represented as points—73 of which were 
removed from analysis because they fell outside the range of the Thiessen polygons and could 
not be reliably assigned to a forest type. In addition, 156 parcels were removed due to missing 
household allocations. This left 1298 points (i.e., parcels) in the model. Each point was also 
assigned the zonal mean WDRVI, elevation, slope, and slope aspect within a 500 m radius; 500 
m was chosen to reflect the typical 500–600 m home range of a wild boar (Ohashi et al. 2013). 
Figure 4.3 illustrates vegetation distribution and camera trap and parcel locations, with the 




Figure 4.3. Map of study site, camera traps, parcels, and vegetation types. 
 
In-person interviews were conducted with households in a stratified random sample. Based 
on a 2013 census that had identified 3256 households, 1160 households were selected in hopes of 
obtaining 650 usable interviews after eliminating households with no knowledgeable member 
present due to travel or other circumstances. The target of 650 households was selected 
somewhat arbitrarily to ensure satisfactory statistical power. The 3256 households were divided 
into 123 sampling units; 58 of these units were selected and assigned to 20 administrative 
villages in proportion to each village’s population size. This produced a slight overrepresentation 
of smaller villages. In total, 20 households were selected from each administrative village per 
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sampling unit; 1160 households were ultimately selected, and full surveys were completed for 
605 households in 2014. In 2015, these 605 households were revisited, and 494 full surveys were 
completed (An et al. 2020). Details are available at http://complexities.org/pes/research/recent-
updates. The household head was interviewed when possible; otherwise any other available, 
knowledgeable adult was interviewed. Each interviewee indicated the level of crop raiding over 
the past twelve months on a five-point Likert scale where 1 = “no crop raiding,” 2 = “non-serious 
crop raiding,” 3 = “somewhat serious crop raiding,” 4 = “serious crop raiding,” and 5 = “very 
serious crop raiding.” The Likert scale is useful for analyzing ordinal data like this when the 
distances between values, i.e., perceived seriousness, cannot be practically measured (Allen & 
Seaman 2007). Respondents also answered whether the severity had increased, decreased, or 
remained constant over the past 10 years. These interviews also covered each household’s 
demographics, work and migration history, participation in GTGP, experience with crop raiding, 
agricultural holdings, and other topics related to livelihood and lifestyle. This produced a total of 
605 household interviews; in 2015, all 605 households were revisited to provide more 
information on land use and assist in participatory mapping of their agricultural holdings. A total 
of 494 household interviews were completed in 2015. Each household identified the location of 
its agricultural parcels on a local map, which were later converted to point coordinates. This 
provided a dataset with 1,298 agricultural fields, each assigned to a household with the 
household’s respective survey responses. 
4.2.3 Data Analyses 
To evaluate the ability to predict boar density from WDRVI, slope, elevation, and aspect, 
separate Ordinary Least-Square (OLS) regression analyses were run for each vegetation type and 
for all five vegetation types combined, using the three interpolated boar densities (obtained using 
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three different k-values in the IDW) as dependent variables. Prior studies have shown OLS 
regressions are useful for habitat suitability models (Ricotta et al. 2010) despite imperfectly 
linear relationships and may even fit the data better than alternatives like nonlinear quantile 
regression (VanDerWal et al. 2009). While a nonlinear function like a general additive model 
may have provided slightly more accurate predictions of boar density at the validation parcels 
based on the calibration parcels, because the OLS stage of this analysis was simply meant to test 
the usefulness of these variables at each vegetation type before geographically weighted analysis 
later on, we opted for the simplicity of OLS. Separate regressions for each vegetation type were 
run to account for differences in how attracted boar are to different types (Thurfjell et al. 2009). 
These OLS models were calibrated using clustered random samples of agricultural fields for 
each vegetation class; parcels were chosen via a random number generator where the parcel with 
the unique ID matching that number, and those with the next four unique IDs, were selected. 
This clustering technique was selected to save time over simple random sampling of one parcel 
at a time, while the clusters were small enough (5 out of 1298 parcels at a time) to help ensure 
wide distribution and relative independence among selected parcels. This selection process was 
repeated until 25% of the parcels had been chosen; these would become the “validation” group 
and the rest would form the “calibration” group. The linear models derived from each calibration 
group were then applied to the validation parcels within the same vegetation class, and a new 
OLS regression was run to relate predicted to observed (i.e., interpolated) boar density. A 
positive, statistically significant relationship between predicted and observed values indicated 
that the model was useful in predicting boar density. Closer slope estimates to 1.0, together with 
intercepts closer to zero, showed that the model exhibited higher accuracy and transferability. 
After calibrating and validating models for each k-value and each vegetation type, we needed to 
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select the k-value that best reflected the dispersal of wild boar around the camera traps. The best 
k-value is that for which predicted and measured values are the closest, which can be answered 
using R2 (Griffiths et al. 2016). Regressions based on the k = 1 interpolated boar density 
produced the highest R2 values in calibration for three of the five forest types and the combined 
model. It also provided the highest R2 values when validating the regressions for four of the five 
forest types and the combined model. Thus, the IDW interpolation using k = 1 was used for the 
remainder of analysis. Models obtained using the calibration and validation datasets are listed in 
Table 4.1. 
Table 4. 1. OLS regression models for interpolated boar population density in 2016. 
Vegetation Type Linear Regression n R2 
Evergreen broad 
𝐵𝑃𝐷 = 0.034 + 0.007(𝑊𝐷𝑅𝑉𝐼) + 0.0004 𝑐(𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒) − 0.000004(𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑣) − 0.0008 𝑐(TRMI) 189 0.18 
𝐵𝑃𝐷 = −0.008 + 1.226 𝑐(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) 63 0.19 
Bamboo 
𝐵𝑃𝐷 = 0.025 − 0.001(𝑊𝐷𝑅𝑉𝐼) + 0.003 𝑐(𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒) − 0.00008 𝑐(𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑣) − 0.0004(TRMI) 161 0.49 
𝐵𝑃𝐷 = −0.009 + 1.460 𝑐(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) 53 0.51 
Conifer 
𝐵𝑃𝐷 = 0.028 + 0.014 𝑐(𝑊𝐷𝑅𝑉𝐼) + 0.0001 𝑏(𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒) − 0.00003 𝑐(𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑣) − 0.0002 𝑐(TRMI) 283 0.68 
𝐵𝑃𝐷 = 0.0007 + 0.974 𝑐(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) 95 0.55 
Mixed broad 
𝐵𝑃𝐷 = 0.057 + 0.061 𝑐(𝑊𝐷𝑅𝑉𝐼) − 0.0002(𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒) − 0.00005 𝑐(𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑣) − 0.00003(TRMI) 295 0.21 
𝐵𝑃𝐷 = −0.010 + 1.518 𝑐(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) 98 0.38 
Deciduous 
𝐵𝑃𝐷 = 0.008 + 0.066 𝑐(𝑊𝐷𝑅𝑉𝐼) + 0.003(𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒) − 0.00007 𝑐(𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑣) − 0.00004(TRMI) 46 0.98 
𝐵𝑃𝐷 = 0.041 − 0.049 𝑎(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) 15 0.19 
Combined 
𝐵𝑃𝐷 = 0.053 + 0.048 𝑐(𝑊𝐷𝑅𝑉𝐼) + 0.0005 𝑐(𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒) − 0.00004 𝑐(𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑣) − 0.0010 𝑐(TRMI) 974 0.45 
𝐵𝑃𝐷 = −0.0009 + 1.086 𝑐(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) 324 0.43 
a: p < 0.10, b: p < 0.05 and c: p < 0.01 (based on robust standard errors). 
After investigating whether remotely sensed variables could be used to predict wild boar 
density, a new series of regression analyses was run to predict boar population density over time. 
First, the same variables from the OLS models were put into a geographically weighted 
regression (GWR) model to estimate a spatially variable model of boar density based on 
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vegetation type, WDRVI, elevation, slope, and aspect-derived moisture index in the 500 m 
surrounding each agricultural field. GWR was selected as it is likely to provide more spatially 
accurate estimations of the effects of environmental variables than global OLS models could 
when spatial variability in the research question is of importance (Brunsdon et al. 1996). (Slope 
was not included as a coefficient for deciduous forests because its values were too clustered for 
the software to process without error; we deemed this an acceptable omission given slope’s lack 
of significance in the OLS model for deciduous forests.) These models were calibrated using the 
WDRVI values from the 2016 Landsat image and the slope, aspect, and elevation values from 
the DEM, then the point-specific coefficients were applied to the 1990, 1996, 2002, and 2011 
Landsat images to estimate boar exposure on each field during those years. The model was 
applied across multiple years to estimate whether boar populations had increased or decreased 
overall over time and whether our modeled population densities correlated with crop raiding 
reported by farmers. These years were selected because they provided mostly cloud-free near-
anniversary dates and covered periods before and after the implementation of GTGP in 2000. 
The boar density value at each parcel for each year was then subtracted from the GWR-predicted 
value based on the 2016 image, producing four new variables estimating change in boar density 
between the given year and 2016. This was an appropriate way to estimate historical boar 
distributions because habitat suitability, which can be modeled through indicators like vegetation 
index and topography, is a widely used indicator of population distribution (Ackers et al. 2015; 
Schairer et al. 1999). Figure 4.4 illustrates the methodology for estimating boar density in current 
and past years. This dataset was then joined by household ID with the 2015 household survey 
dataset (n = 494). These records went into a random effects logistic regression grouped by 
household, where the dependent variable was whether or not the household had experienced 
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“serious” or “very serious” crop raiding over the past 12 months (scores 4–5 on the Likert scale), 
and the independent variable was the GWR-predicted boar density from the 2016 image. A 
separate regression was run for each vegetation type. A similar set of regressions was then run 
wherein the dependent variable was whether the respondent believed crop raiding had decreased 
in the past 10 years and the independent variable was the estimated change in boar density at the 
parcel since 1990, 1996, 2002, and 2011. This was to help validate our model of historical boar 
population distribution by comparing it with the local understandings of people who would have 
experienced these fluctuations firsthand. With five vegetation types and four images prior to 




Figure 4.4. Methodological framework for estimating boar density across years. 
 
4.3 Results 
Table 4.2 shows the mean estimated boar density for each vegetation type. Figure 5 shows 
the percentage of 446 households that rated crop raiding at each level of seriousness based on the 
Likert scale from “none” to “very serious,” as well as the percentages who believed crop raiding 
had lessened, remained steady, or increased over the past 10 years. 40.2% believed crop raiding 
had worsened in the past 10 years, 21.4% believed it had remained steady, and 28.4% believed it 
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had lessened. Figure 4.6 illustrates how these responses were distributed across the reserve. We 
used a survey conducted on the same sample the previous year (2014) to confirm that wild boars 
were the most-blamed species for crop raiding, with 93.7% of respondents who experienced crop 
raiding stating that wild boar was the species that caused the most damage. This confirmed boar 
population was an appropriate proxy for crop damage risk. “Boar per day” estimates for each 
camera trap ranged from 0 to 0.18; 48 of the 71 camera traps did not record any boar during 
summer, and the highest number of boars observed in one day was four. 
 





Figure 4.6. Household perceptions of crop raiding throughout the region. 
 
On average, estimated boar density decreased slightly within each 500 m radius around 
agricultural fields between 1990 and 2016. Across all vegetation types, predicted boar density 
decreased by a mean of 0.00005 BPD (SD 0.0002). However, trends varied widely by vegetation 
type. Mean change in boar density by agricultural field since 1990, 1996, 2002, and 2011, along 
with the maximum increase and decrease, are listed by vegetation type in Table 4.3. Predictive 
model accuracies also varied by vegetation type. When a single model was applied to all forest 
types at once, it performed respectably (R2 = 0.45) and generally followed the correlations found 
in separate models. Across the entire study area, boar density was positively explained by 
vegetation index (+0.048 BPD per unit WDRVI; p < 0.01), positively explained by slope 
(+0.0005 BPD per degree; p < 0.01), negatively explained by elevation (−0.004 BPD per 100 m; 
p < 0.01), and negatively explained by aspect-derived moisture index (−0.0010 BPD per point; p 
< 0.01). This suggests boars overall prefer lower, dryer, steeper slopes with denser vegetation. 
The model was strongest in conifer forests with high internal consistency (i.e., accuracy of the 
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model within the spatial range of calibration sites) at (R2 = 0.68) and was well validated (β1 = 
0.974; β0 = 0.0007; p < 0.01; R
2 = 0.55). In conifer forests, boar density was positively correlated 
with vegetation index (+0.014 BPD per one-unit increase in WDRVI; p < 0.01), positively 
correlated with slope (+0.0001 BPD per degree; p < 0.05), negatively correlated with elevation 
(−0.003 BPD per 100 m; p < 0.01); and negatively correlated with aspect-derived moisture index 
(−0.0002 BPD per point; p < 0.01). The bamboo model was moderately strong; there was 
moderate internal consistency within the model (R2 = 0.49) and it fit the validation parcels well 
(β1 = 1.460; β0 = -0.009; p<0.01; R
2 = 0.51). In bamboo forests, boar density was positively 
correlated with slope (+0.003 BPD per degree; p < 0.01), negatively correlated with elevation 
(−0.008 BPD per 100 m; p < 0.01), and uncorrelated with vegetation index or aspect. In 
evergreen broadleaf domains, where the model had a somewhat low internal consistency (R2 = 
0.18), boar density was positively correlated with slope (+0.0004 BPD per degree; p < 0.01), 
negatively correlated with aspect-derived moisture index (−0.0008 BPD per point; p < 0.01), and 
uncorrelated with vegetation index and elevation. The validation performed similarly well to the 
calibration (β1 = 1.226; β0 = −0.008; p < 0.01; R
2 = 0.19). Model R2 for mixed broadleaf forests 
was also moderately low (R2 = 0.21), and the model applied less effectively to validation parcels 
(β1 = 1.518; β0 = −0.010; p < 0.01; R
2 = 0.38). Here, boar density was positively correlated with 
vegetation index (+0.061 BPD per unit WDRVI; p < 0.01), negatively correlated with elevation 
(−0.005 BPD per 100 m), and uncorrelated with slope and aspect. The deciduous forest model 
had the highest internal consistency; with an R2 of 0.98, it showed boar density positively 
correlated with vegetation index (+0.066 BPD per unit WDRVI; p < 0.01), negatively correlated 
with elevation (−0.007 BPD per 100 m; p < 0.01), and uncorrelated with slope or aspect. Despite 
the high internal consistency, model validation failed; the relationship between predicted and 
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interpolated boar density was negative. This was unsurprising given the smaller sample size and 
dense clustering of most deciduous plots. Overall, estimated boar density decreased slightly 
across the study site between 1990 and 2016; it decreased in evergreen broadleaf, conifer, and 
mixed broadleaf forests, but increased in bamboo and deciduous domains. Still, the direction and 
magnitude of change varied considerably within each vegetation type.  
Table 4.2. Mean estimated boar density by vegetation type. 
Vegetation Type Est. Boar Per Day One Boar Per—Days 
Evergreen broad 0.034 (SD = 0.007) 30 
Bamboo 0.029 (SD = 0.017) 35 
Conifer 0.007 (SD = 0.005) 133 
Mixed broad 0.014 (SD = 0.012) 72 
Deciduous 0.032 (SD = 0.013) 31 
Combined 0.019 (SD = 0.015) 52 
 
Table 4.3. Mean change in estimated boar per day between years, and maximum increase and 























−0.00007 −0.0005 −0.0017 +0.0005 +0.00006 −0.0013 
Bamboo +0.0014 -0.00004 +0.0008 +0.0002 +0.0134 −0.0029 
Conifer −0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0003 +0.0001 +0.0014 −0.0023 
Mixed broad −0.0009 −0.0013 −0.0021 +0.0005 +0.0063 −0.0114 
Deciduous +0.0007 +0.0049 +0.0014 +0.0019 +0.0082 −0.0018 
Combined −0.00005 −0.0002 −0.0006 +0.0003 +0.0134 −0.0114 
 
Geographically weighted regressions reflected survey-reported perceptions of crop raiding 
in some vegetation types. In conifer and deciduous forests, higher estimated boar density 
correlated with a greater likelihood that a householder had experienced “serious” or “very 
serious” crop raiding over the previous twelve months. Relationships between predicted boar 
density and reported crop raiding severity were not statistically significant for evergreen 
broadleaf, bamboo, or deciduous forests. Probability of reporting crop raiding as “serious” or 
“very serious” is illustrated in Figure 4.7. Changes in estimated boar density also correlated with 
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reported changes in severity for some years in evergreen broadleaf, conifer, and deciduous 
forests. In evergreen broadleaf forests, respondents who had experienced greater decreases in 
boar density since 1990 or 1996 were more likely to report crop raiding having decreased during 
the past 10 years. This was also the case for conifer and deciduous forests that had experienced 
greater decreases in estimated boar density since 1996. Estimated changes in boar density did not 
correlate with the likelihood of reporting lessened crop raiding in bamboo or mixed broadleaf 
forests for any year. Figure 4.8 illustrates the probability a respondent reported crop raiding as 
decreasing if predicted boar density had decreased by 0.001 BPD between each comparison year 
and 2016. All logistic regression models are listed in Table 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.7. Probability of reporting crop raiding as “serious” or “very serious” by vegetation and 




Figure 4.8. Probability of reporting crop raiding having lessened in the past 10 years if estimated 
boar density decreased by 0.001 BPD between the given year and 2015 (* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01). 
 
Table 4.4. Log-odds of reporting crop raiding as “serious” or “very serious” in the 2015 survey 
based on interpolated boar density (“In 2015”); log-odds of reporting crop raiding as becoming 
less severe in the past 10 years based on estimated changes in boar dens 
Vegetation In 2015 Since 1990 Since 1996 Since 2002 Since 2011 
Evergreen −22.6 − 340(d) −1.73 − 9967(Δd) ** −2.21 − 6025(Δd) ** 3.62 − 1324(Δd) −3.73 − 597(Δd)  
Bamboo −1.10 + 42.6(d) 1.28 − 259(Δd) −3.75 + 1030(Δd) 0.807 − 78.9(Δd) −4.69 + 625(Δd)  
Conifer −7.85 + 646(d) ** −0.502 − 1596(Δd) −2.05 − 4395(Δd) * −1.10 − 2689(Δd) 1.18 − 1860(Δd) 
Mixed −5.15 + 111(d) 0.416 − 15.0(Δd) −3.54 − 411(Δd) −4.07 − 470(Δd) −1.41 − 52.2(Δd)  
Deciduous −8.30 + 217(d) ** 6.07 − 488(Δd) 31.8 − 13233(Δd) ** −18.9 + 523(Δd) −1.17 − 43.3(Δd) 
d = predicted boar density (boar per day) from 2016 image and GWR regressions; * p < 
0.05; ** p < 0.01. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
Our results suggest remotely sensed variables are useful for estimating boar population 
density and crop raiding severity under certain vegetation types. Bamboo and coniferous forests 
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produced models with moderate to high internal consistency and transferability (moderately high 
R2 in the OLS calibration and validation models within each forest type). In these vegetation 
types, remotely sensed vegetation indices and topography seem to be useful for estimating boar 
density with minimal costs, and it is also feasible to estimate year-to-year variations in wild boar 
population density. However, this should be further verified with multiyear ground estimates of 
boar populations. Although the modeling strategy was less internally consistent and transferrable 
for mixed and evergreen broadleaf forests than it was for bamboo and coniferous forests, it still 
may provide some useful information, but results from this model need to be interpreted more 
cautiously. Furthermore, the model’s lack of significant relationship with vegetation index in 
evergreen broadleaf and bamboo domains suggests this technique would not be useful in 
providing multi-year estimates there because vegetation index is the only predictive variable that 
can change substantially from year to year. The model for deciduous forests, although exhibiting 
extremely high internal consistency, exhibited no transferability as the relationship between 
predicted and interpolated values was negative and small. This contradiction may have occurred 
due to the smaller sample size and densely clustered pattern of the deciduous units; most of these 
fields were densely packed at the south end of the reserve with a few fields scattered along the 
northern end. The randomly selected calibration parcels all happened to occur at the south end, 
so it is unsurprising that the model would have poor predictive ability in parcels located more 
than 30 km away and whose vicinity was not represented in the calibration. With better dispersed 
survey units, it may be feasible to derive a usable model for deciduous forests using this method. 
It should also be noted that camera traps were generally placed in more geographically accessible 
locations due to the region’s rough terrain (Chen et al. 2020); this may have limited our model’s 
usability in some regions. 
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While this dataset does not allow us to verify crop damage or historical boar populations 
through ground estimates, household survey responses offer insights that can be used to 
corroborate the models. In conifer and deciduous forests, households whose fields showed higher 
risk of crop raiding by wild boars were more likely to report having experienced “serious” or 
“very serious” crop raiding in the past 12 months. This suggests that the model constitutes a 
useful predictor of boar density in these forest types. In conifer, evergreen broadleaf, and 
deciduous forests, households whose fields had higher estimated decreases in boar exposure 
since 1996 were more likely to report that crop raiding had decreased in the past 10 years; this 
was also true for changes since 1990 in evergreen broadleaf forests. While there was no 
correlation between the estimated boar densities since 2002 or 2011 and the reported crop raiding 
trajectory, this does not necessarily undermine the hypothesized relationship during the decade in 
question. It cannot be assumed that respondents confined their thought processes to the 10 years 
specified in the survey (2005–2015), as it is common for respondents to “telescope” prior years 
into a given period, especially regarding routine, non-landmark events (Gaskell et al. 2000). 
Their responses may thus reflect changes prior to the decade defined by the survey if changes 
before 2005 are “telescoped” in. Further, although our results suggest our modeling framework 
best captures population conditions in conifer forests, it is important to underline that these 
forests have the lowest boar densities among the vegetation types evaluated despite conifer 
forests’ wide geographic coverage and high sample size (n = 378). While this may reduce the 
model’s utility at this study site, it shows our methods are more useful in conifer-dominated 
landscapes that experience substantial crop raiding by wild boars. 
The results obtained in this study address a critical issue in human–wildlife conflict: that of 
gaps between human perceptions of wildlife actions and biophysical realities (Muhar et al. 
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2018). Human–wildlife conflict is fraught with misconceptions, and farmers often overestimate 
the threat that wildlife pose to their crops (Hill 2004). This can exacerbate the resistance to 
conservation efforts and environmental gains (Linkie et al. 2007; Nyhus & Tilson 2000); it may 
also lead to misdirected efforts to mitigate farmers’ losses and reduce tensions. However, this 
study’s correlations between perceived crop raiding occurrence, and its temporal trajectories, 
with modeled boar population density provides preliminary evidence that perceptions and reality 
are often in sync, at least within our study area. Under these circumstances, technical assistance 
to reduce crop raiding may effectively reduce tensions and preserve cooperation with 
conservation actions. Of course, given that this dataset does not measure actual crop damage or 
ask landholders for more detailed information on their experiences, this study does not provide 
sufficient proof on its own. Further research with objective, physical measurements of crop 
damage, together with more detailed information on landholders’ perceptions, are needed to 
verify correlations among modeled boar density, actual crop raiding, and perceived crop raiding. 
Nevertheless, this study does provide nascent support for the validity of crop raiding perceptions 
as well as a methodological skeleton for further investigation with more detailed data. 
The authors emphasize this study is exploratory, intended more to test the feasibility of the 
methodological framework than to provide concrete answers on wild boar and crop raiding at 
Fanjingshan. Along these lines, it is important to note that forecasting based on population 
estimates from such a limited timeframe is dubious; this methodology would be better employed 
with camera trap data from several years, ideally spread out. Adding temporal depth to the 
camera trapping estimates would also allow for the inclusion of critical climatic data like year-to-
year variations in temperature and moisture, which may vastly improve habitat and population 
predictions. This study indeed demonstrates the utility of camera traps, remotely sensed images, 
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and household surveys in deriving empirical relationships between boar distributions and 
present-day crop raiding burdens. Meanwhile the correlations between estimated boar 
distributions over time and landholders’ perceptions of worsening or abating crop raiding suggest 
the modeling techniques described here may be useful for updating habitat maps and planning 
interventions based on time-variant, remotely sensed variables like vegetation and weather. 
Creating reliable forecasts of boar population and crop damage using these methods will, of 
course, call for richer data from which to calibrate the models. Future studies should refine this 
methodology with multi-year camera trap measurements (or other reliable population estimation 
techniques), weather data, and physical measurements of crop damage that do not rely solely on 
landholders’ perceptions. After investing in a robust foundation of data, this modeling technique 
may provide an effective, affordable means of managing wildlife and their damage to crops as 
populations fluctuate and shift over time. 
4.5 Conclusions 
This study uncovers the potential to improve crop raiding monitoring and management 
over multi-decade periods at minimal cost after initial ground population estimates are made. 
This may help design cost-effective, easily updatable compensation schemes and technical 
interventions to minimize economic burdens to farmers. It also empirically affirms anecdotal 
understandings of crop raiding’s relationship to regional ecological changes in some vegetation 
domains. Although the model suggests crop raiding is not increasing for all households, it 
demonstrates fine-scale heterogeneity in both realities and perceptions. While the boar density 
models obtained for Fanjingshan cannot (and should not) be applied to other areas directly (De 
Leeuw et al. 2002), the methods for deriving geographically weighted coefficients described here 
may allow for cost-effective, long-term monitoring of wild boar populations and crop raiding 
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risks at other sites around the world. Given the expense of continuous ground measurements and 
the limited resources in many affected communities, this may improve boar management and 
compensation arrangements at minimal cost by allowing practitioners to update distribution 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This project has contributed to a stronger understanding of the long-term environmental 
and socioeconomic effects of China’s Gran to Green Program, offering insight into the 
mechanics and results of other PES systems especially in the developing world. It explored the 
roles of noneconomic motivations for PES participation, the nuances of GTGP’s effect on off-
farm employment, and how the success of the program may be complicated by increased human-
wildlife conflict in some areas. These findings reveal opportunities to expand the program in a 
cost-effective way, and also highlight the need for equitable supports like job-finding assistance 
and compensation structures for crops lost to raiding. The region’s ongoing shift away from 
agriculture bodes well for the long-term survival of GTGP-planted secondary forests, but 
addressing the needs of those still reliant on agriculture is necessary to ensure equitable and 
continued socioeconomic and ecological gains.  
 The first discovery is the potentially profound influence social norms have on rural 
dwellers’ cooperation with the PES program. While it has long been accepted that people are 
more likely to accept personal inconveniences on behalf of the environment if they believe others 
around them are doing the same, this phenomenon had primarily been tested on small, routine 
behaviors like recycling and “green consumption” (Cialdini 2003; Goldstein & Cialdini 2003; 
Stern 2000) rather than the highly financially incentivized, livelihood-altering, and several-year 
commitment PES entails. This study’s choice experiment revealed social norms play a major role 
in PES enrollment that can easily rival or exceed the influence of financial incentives. 
Importantly, social norms appear most influential when payment levels are moderate; norms do 
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little to make up for opportunity costs when payments are low. When payments are moderate, in 
this experiment slightly less than the average payment already received by Fanjingshan farmers, 
social norms appeared even more influential than money; this suggests program administrators 
may increase enrollment without increasing payment by emphasizing the program’s existing 
popularity in the region. However, administrators should not capitalize on “peer pressure” 
without careful consideration of equity implications.  
 This study revealed other factors of enrollment that may help identify willing 
participants. Those who were older or had off-farm wage work were more willing to participate 
in GTGP; this is consistent with other studies that confirm PES is more attractive to older adults 
who may wish to retire from physically-intensive cultivation (Chen et al. 2010; Chen et al. 2009) 
and those who are already less dependent on agriculture (Chen et al. 2012; Zbinden & Lee 2005). 
However, this study uncovered an anomalous and counterintuitive effect of education, wherein 
more educated respondents were less willing to enroll. We hypothesize this is because GTGP 
offers a rare opportunity for low-education households to diversify and stabilize income as they 
are less likely to be hired off-farm locally or in cities (Yost et al. 2020). It must be noted that this 
effect should not be assumed in other regional or cultural contexts; education levels at 
Fanjingshan are extremely low, averaging less than five years, so education may be a stronger 
barrier to employment for Fanjingshan residents than in other communities with higher literacy 
and other skills. As average educational attainment rises in rural China due to the 1986 
formalization of compulsory schooling (Fan et al. 2004), expanding options for income 
diversification may reduce households’ eagerness to enroll in GTGP as an income stabilizing 
measure, but may nonetheless contribute to the program’s objectives by helping them 
transferring labor off-farm. 
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 Along the lines of a transitioning labor force, the second chapter illustrated factors of 
income diversification and their potential implications for social equity and the long-term fate of 
GTGP lands. Fanjingshan is moving away from agriculture toward tourism and other sectors, 
and GTGP appears to influence these employment pursuits. More specifically, it increases the 
likelihood of taking nonagricultural wage work while decreasing the likelihood of doing 
agricultural wage work on other households’ farms. This illustrates a divergence that is generally 
ignored in PES literature on the developing world, which tends to treat off-farm work as 
monolithically desirable. Other studies (Uchida et al. 2007; Uchida et al. 2009) have generally 
asserted farmers in developing countries who enroll in PES seize the opportunity to replace on-
farm cultivation with other activities, thus increasing their income both through PES subsidies 
and new wages. This is in contrast with developed-world farmers who, upon receiving 
guaranteed PES payments, allot their extra time to leisure. This developed-world effect appeared 
at Fanjingshan among farmers who work on neighboring farms; when they received PES 
payments, they used the opportunity to suspend this agricultural wage work. This may have 
important implications for long-term land cover; when GTGP contracts expire and payments 
cease, these workers will likely be forced to resume cultivation and clear GTGP plantings. To 
help ensure lasting land use changes, program administration may need to help GTGP recipients 
find employment that will replace the need for both cultivation and PES subsidies. This may be 
achieved through job training, transportation assistance, and other supports that reduce barriers to 
off-farm employment. Two key barriers in this study are gender and education; women and 
people with less schooling are considerably less likely to work nonagricultural jobs, so they may 
be ideal candidates for such employment supports. 
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 Although the voluntary and compensatory nature of PES is often assumed to ensure net 
benefits for agricultural communities, this project presents potential negative consequences 
related to human-wildlife conflict, especially for households still reliant in whole or in part on 
cultivation. It introduces a new methodological framework to estimate boar populations over 
space and time using remotely sensed variables, which offers potential to predict and manage 
human-wildlife conflicts over a large area while avoiding the expense of continual, direct 
population measurements. A synthesis of camera trap measurements and remotely sensed images 
suggests wild boar populations and crop raiding have increased during the years GTGP has been 
active, and these findings are corroborated by household surveys wherein reports of crop raiding 
correlate spatially with modeled boar populations. To maximize accuracy and account for spatial 
disparities in how environmental variables interact, this study used geographically weighted 
regression (GWR) as coefficients are allowed to vary across the landscape. While the analysis so 
far does more to explore the feasibility of the methodology than it does to provide conclusive 
answers on local wildlife dynamics and conflict, the project produced statistically and practically 
significant models that confirm remotely sensed variables may be used to manage human-
wildlife conflict. Using one set of camera trap observations, this study established empirical 
relationships between boar distribution and environmental variables that are easily derived from 
cost-free remotely sensed images and may eventually replace some of the need for costly camera 
trapping, especially in cash-strapped developing-world contexts.  
 Another key finding in this chapter is correlation between modeled boar distribution and 
local households’ perceptions of crop raiding severity. Communities sometimes assign 
exaggerated responsibility to certain species for agricultural damage (Hill 2004), and the value of 
human perceptions in human-wildlife conflict is increasingly under scrutiny (Muhar et al. 2017). 
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In this study, boar population distribution was modeled completely independently from human 
perceptions, and household responses reflected both the trajectories and current state of boar 
populations, especially in conifer and evergreen broadleaf forests. While there is much room to 
refine this modeling technique, not least by collecting direct and objective measurements of crop 
raiding, the methodology shows remotely sensed variables may soon aid spatially-cognizant 
management of crop raiding even when continuous wildlife monitoring is not feasible. And 
because there appears to be some level of congruity between human perceptions and actual boar 
populations, technical or compensatory interventions may effectively reduce the social burdens 
of human-wildlife conflict and help preserve local cooperation with reforestation.  
 By addressing the nuances of social norms, livelihood alternatives, and ecological 
changes that are not often considered in PES planning, this dissertation sets an example for 
systems-based policy analysis. It abandons any assumption that the socioeconomic or 
environmental results of GTGP results are static, permanent, or homogenous, and instead 
explores diverse reactions of humans and wildlife to the program with special attention to how 
land cover will change when contracts expire or the program ends. This emphasis on post-
program outcomes is especially critical to PES research as an ideal program does not need to be 
funded indefinitely to produce long-lasting ecological results (Pattanayak et al. 2010). The 
region’s economic shift from agriculture into other sectors offers some assurance that many 
GTGP lands will remain reforested even after payments end, but it is obvious not all enrollees 
can or will forego cultivation on GTGP parcels permanently. Some may be willing and able to 
remain off-farm, perhaps with modest incentives and supports, but those who remain in 
agriculture may need continued assistance to maintain the same standards of living provided 
during PES, especially if the program has increased wildlife burdens. By capitalizing on social 
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norms, facilitating permanent employment transitions, and improving management of human-
wildlife conflict, GTGP managers may improve both the long-term social and ecological 
effectiveness of the program. 
5.1 Challenges 
Results of this project highlight opportunities and challenges for GTGP implementation. 
First, there are practical and ethical considerations for the use of social norms and 
sociodemographic characteristics in program recruitment. While there is a pragmatic motivation 
to maximize enrollment at the lowest cost, efficiency can come at a social cost as poorer 
households settle for low compensation. Even using social norms to encourage enrollment may 
be morally dubious in some cases if households if already-poor households feel pressured to act 
against their own economic best interests. The majority of GTGP participants at Fanjingshan live 
below the poverty line, and a corporate-style fixation on financial efficiency may easily be 
criticized as exploitative (Pascual et al. 2014). Still, social norms may be a valuable tool to 
encourage enrollment under non-exploitative terms, which begs the question of how to capitalize 
on them, especially in areas where the program is not yet pervasive. This may be accomplished 
through public meetings that facilitate interaction among unenrolled landholders and program 
administrators or enrollees; such meetings would also allow administrators to relay information, 
which has been shown to motivate enrollment (Page & Bellotti 2015; Zbinden & Lee 2005; 
Zanella et al. 2014).  
Another challenge illustrated here is how to address GTGP’s disparate effects on access 
to off-farm employment. While results confirm GTGP participants are more likely to have off-
farm wage work, other barriers persist, especially for women and those with lower educational 
attainment. This ties into our findings that less educated individuals are more likely to express 
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intent to enroll in GTGP at a lower payment rate; while this may make them seem like ideal 
GTGP participants, results may not be long-lasting if they cannot easily seize their freed-up labor 
capacity for new types of work that can sustain them post-contract. This may be partially 
ameliorated by a change in compensation structure where per-hectare subsidies are 
complemented by employment supports like skills training or transportation assistance, which 
may help suppress any dichotomy whereby the households most willing to enroll are inherently 
the most likely to reconvert to agriculture after payments stop. Along these lines, the program 
may address its apparent lack of influence on self-employment with entrepreneurial incentives to 
mitigate risk, as well as basic business training to offset limited education. Appealingly, there is 
potential for synergy between employment and entrepreneurial supports as new enterprises may 
create additional off-farm jobs, so wage-work and entrepreneurial assistance may contribute even 
more to labor transition. 
 Investigation into crop raiding illustrated another challenge for PES and many other types 
of environmental interventions: the high data demands of human-wildlife conflict evaluation. 
While the methodological framework presented here illustrated the potential utility of remote 
sensing for projecting human-wildlife conflict, the limited detail and temporal depth of the data 
makes my study more experimental than robustly applicable. Multi-year camera trap estimates 
would greatly add to the methodology’s potential as it would allow for the inclusion of variables 
that change from year to year, namely annual precipitation and average temperature, as well as 
unexplained fluctuations in species population that would help ground population estimates near 
a true “average,” provide reasonable intervals within which population levels may fall under the 
same model conditions, and allow for sensitivity analysis. The next iteration of this methodology 
should also incorporate the expertise of wildlife biologists to more accurately identify habitat 
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potential and account for detection probabilities (Gu & Swihart 2004) and other critical 
measures. Further, there is much room for more direct crop raiding measurements within the 
methodology; this study relied on respondents’ single-moment perceptions of crop raiding 
severity on an ordinal scale, and while results suggest this is a useful indicator, it is limited in its 
ability to provide accurate estimates of severity, and even less to provide economic estimates of 
losses, which would be necessary to set up appropriate technical interventions or compensation 
schemes. Nonetheless, this study confirmed a reasonable level of utility for remotely sensed 
variables and geographically weighted regression in human-wildlife conflict, as well as the 
legitimacy of landholder perceptions in a research landscape that increasingly doubts the 
accuracy of rural dwellers’ assessments of wildlife damages. 
 An overarching limitation to GTGP research is the departure between the neoliberal 
theory of PES and the realities of China’s land tenure system. Market-based environmental 
management invokes explicitly defined private property, wherein landowners are free to exclude 
other users barring voluntary sale of property or associated rights (Kosoy & Corbera 2010). 
Rural China, however, operates by collective ownership at the village level with land allocated to 
households on fixed-term contracts. This creates a landscape of small, highly fragmented parcels 
(Yan et al. 2014) that are used but not owned by private households, and which may be 
reallocated periodically based on changing local demographics (Mullan et al. 2010). While the 
Rural Land Contract Law of 2002 discourages reallocation until the year 2028 (Wang et al. 
2011) and brings the system closer to a private property regime (Mullan et al. 2010), there 
remains concern over how impermanent land tenure affects livelihood strategies (Zinda & Zhang 
2018; Grosjean & Kontoleon 2009; Yan et al. 2014), and some researchers argue tenure 
insecurity is a major barrier to GTGP’s long-term sustainability and effectiveness. Grosjean and 
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Kontoleon (2009) found households with lower tenure security required higher payments to be 
willing to enroll; meanwhile, households may lose access to GTGP payments and converted 
lands may fall under new control upon the next reallocation. This introduces uncertainties that 
complicate both farmers’ decision making and administrators’ planning. So far GTGP has not 
overlapped with a nationwide land allocation, so these effects remain to be seen.  
 Another flaw in applying neoliberal assumptions to GTGP is the program’s inconsistently 
voluntary nature. While the program is voluntary in its wording, “the principle of voluntary 
participation was lost in the process of local implementation” (He & Sikor 2015, p. 213). Local 
officials are under pressure to meet enrollment targets set by higher levels of government, which 
has led some to mandate participation (He & Sikor 2015). Song et al. (2013) found the rate of 
compulsory enrollment varied widely by region; in their survey of Anhui residents, only 9% of 
respondents reported “government mandate” as their primary motivation for participation, while 
86% of their counterparts in Hubei and Shanxi reported having been required. This may appear 
to undermine the relevance of some questions asked in this dissertation, namely how to entice 
landholders and identify which households are most likely to relinquish cultivation rights beyond 
the initial contract cycle. Still, voluntary enrollment is part of the reality of GTGP, and these 
questions may help reduce the need for compulsory enrollment by securing greater voluntary 
participation first. Further, understanding landholders’ expectations and intentions may help 
align contract terms with actual preferences and recruit participants who will most willingly 




5.2 Future Directions 
Much work is needed to understand how GTGP influences land cover and socioeconomic 
opportunities, especially after contracts end. This project illustrated a non-uniform effect of the 
program on off-farm employment, especially as its current structure does not address the 
educational and gender barriers that mark the off-farm labor market in rural China. Future 
research should delve into these issues, perhaps by comparing off-farm labor impacts between 
Fanjingshan and other participating regions with higher average education. More detailed 
household surveys or semi-structured interviews may also help uncover these issues as 
respondents verbally describe their efforts to diversify their income and the logistical challenges 
they encounter. This is critical because long-term success of GTGP, i.e. long-term cropland 
retirement, calls for participating households to embrace permanent alternatives to cultivation. 
The same households most eager to enroll in GTGP to diversify or stabilize their incomes may 
also be those who can least afford to keep land out of cultivation after payments end, as 
illustrated by the agricultural wage workers who appear to reduce their labor hours during the 
program and the lower-educated households that were both more likely to enroll and less likely 
to find off-farm jobs. The question of post-program land use also calls for further analysis of 
social norms, which may have a different influence on the decision to undo GTGP-initiated 
changes. This study showed social norms were less influential when payment level was low, so 
they may not be influential over land use decisions when payments end completely. Still, there 
may be a large normative influence in whether a household chooses whether or not to remove 




 The relationship between human-wildlife conflict and post-program land use must also be 
explored. First, it should be determined empirically how a household’s experience with and 
perceptions of crop raiding influence land use intentions. While it may demotivate a return to 
cultivation, similar to the cropland abandonment demonstrated by Hua et al. (2016), permanent 
cropland retirement may not be an option for some households, especially those with less access 
to permanent, lucrative off-farm employment. These households may not only re-cultivate GTGP 
parcels, but also intensify production on less vulnerable parcels or clear surrounding vegetation 
to reduce boar presence. Either of these actions would offset the conservation gains of GTGP, so 
it is critical to predict whether and when these are likely to occur and which compensatory or 
technical interventions may discourage them. An updated iteration of the remote sensing model 
of crop raiding may be useful for deploying these interventions, especially if it includes more 
concrete measures of crop damage and a temporally deeper well of camera trap data from which 
to draw wildlife distribution estimates. Future data collection should include a participatory 
mapping portion in which landholders identify areas of crop damage and, if possible, economic 
approximations of the losses. This should also be paired with spatially grounded information on 
post-program land use intentions, which may reveal effects of new biophysical or infrastructural 
variables that may simultaneously influence risk from wildlife, lucrativeness of farming, social 
norms, and livelihood alternatives. While this is only a small subset of what are undoubtedly 
many variables that influence post-program land use, further geospatial analysis of all three may 
offer substantial insight into how and where these three factors will influence the post-program 
legacy of GTGP, which may help prepare for appropriate interventions to maintain desirable land 





This study furthers system-based analysis of environmental policy while elucidating key 
practical considerations for GTGP and other PES administrators. It tests the long-standing 
postulate that social norms influence environmental behavior in a new, high-stakes context and 
confirms they are useful motivators as long as compensation offered is fair. It de-homogenizes 
the conversation on off-farm work in the developing world by delineating different types of jobs 
and the people who have them, with attention to these disparities’ implications for long-term 
land use. The project also introduces a novel modeling technique that affirms the applicability of 
remotely sensed data to the growing issue of human-wildlife conflict, and which may soon be 
used to predict and respond to these conflicts in a cost-effective way. In short, this dissertation 
empirically tests factors of coupled human-natural systems that are difficult to plan for and 
usually left out of prospective and retrospective policy analysis. Findings offer opportunities to 
adapt to these factors to maximize the environmental and social gains of GTGP and other PES 
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Appendix A. Non-migrant prioritization for interview 
 
1. Priority 1: Primary breadwinner in the household 
2. Priority 2: Person whose age is closest the age of the migrant selected in the previous 
survey section.  
3. Priority 3, select based on closeness of relationship to head of household (son or daughter 
prioritized over sibling or other relative) 







Appendix B. Empirical line correction equations 
Table A1. Empirical line corrections for radiometric rectification. 
Band Year Equation R2 n 
NIR 
1996 𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 = 0.831 × 𝑅1996 + 534.56 0.85 258 
2002 𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 = 0.952 × 𝑅2002 + 342.27 0.85 258 
2011 𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 = 1.022 × 𝑅2011 − 47.223 0.86 249 
2016 𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 = 0.906 × 𝑅2016 + 218.48 0.85 234 
Red 
1996 𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 = 1.226 × 𝑅1996 + 20.32 0.91 235 
2002 𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 = 1.113 × 𝑅2002 + 69.99 0.86 248 
2011 𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 = 0.892 × 𝑅2011 + 99.455 0.85 243 








Appendix C. Camera trap metadata 
Table A2. Camera trap coordinates and dates of operation. 
Plot 
ID 









2 17 April 2015 16 March 2016 108.761 27.85246   





7 26 April 2015 16 March 2016 108.7217 27.8868   
19 28 April 2015 15 March 2016 108.6994 27.91098 23 June 2015 6 July 2015 
20 28 April 2015 15 March 2016 108.7029 27.90261 30 June 2015 
23 October 
2015 





22 29 April 2015 15 March 2016 108.7075 27.90061   





24 29 April 2015 15 March 2016 108.7245 27.89716   
27 2 May 2015 18 March 2016 108.7736 27.85997   
28 2 May 2015 18 March 2016 108.7725 27.85966   





30 4 May 2015 18 March 2016 108.7302 27.90692   
31 14 May 2015 15 March 2016 108.697 27.78216   
32 14 May 2015 15 March 2016 108.7005 27.78644 26 June 2015 
30 October 
2015 
34 19 May 2015 8 April 2016 108.641 27.81311   
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35 20 May 2015 7 August 2016 108.6495 27.76345   
36 20 May 2015 7 August 2016 108.6499 27.77022   





38 21 May 2015 2 August 2016 108.6257 27.88032   





40 22 May 2015 5 August 2016 108.6422 27.87614   




2 August 2016 108.6471 27.91849   
43 31 May 2015 1 July 2016 108.6558 27.92395   
44 2 June 2015 9 April 2016 108.7692 27.97725   
45 2 June 2015 28 April 2016 108.755 27.97899   
46 2 June 2015 19 April 2016 108.7478 27.97599 1 July 2015 
27 October 
2015 
47 4 June 2015 15 August 2016 108.7607 27.98081   
48 5 June 2015 15 August 2016 108.7549 27.98858   
49 13 June 2015 30 July 2016 108.7384 28.004   
50 13 June 2015 30 July 2016 108.7409 28.00193   
54 23 June 2015 28 July 2016 108.6826 27.91677   





57 24 June 2015 
16 November 
2015 
108.6862 27.78472 3 July 2015 
13 November 
2015 





59 10 July 2015 
14 September 
2015 
108.6747 27.93743   
















27 July 2016 108.7733 27.85921   




27 July 2016 108.7959 27.90966   
14 8 April 2016 5 August 2016 108.6466 27.81613   
77 18 March 2016 12 July 2016 108.7488 27.89871   
76 18 March 2016 27 July 2016 108.7764 27.85929   
75 19 March 2016 10 August 2016 108.7725 27.99097   
15 19 March 2016 18 July 2016 108.7708 27.98718   
74 22 March 2016 24 July 2016 108.7411 27.83366   
73 22 March 2016 12 May 2016 108.7505 27.82971   
72 23 March 2016 10 August 2016 108.7774 27.98696   
71 23 March 2016 12 August 2016 108.7817 27.99012   
70 25 March 2016 14 August 2016 108.7466 27.9684   
68 13 April 2016 15 August 2016 108.7664 27.99333   
67 27 March 2016 20 July 2016 108.781 28.00514   
66 27 March 2016 11 August 2016 108.7815 27.99568   
65 28 March 2016 11 August 2016 108.7746 27.99835   
64 28 March 2016 24 June 2016 108.77 28.0013   
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63 29 March 2016 12 August 2016 108.7759 27.96883   
62 29 March 2016 11 August 2016 108.7852 27.98265   
61 30 March 2016 13 July 2016 108.7564 28.02354   
53 2 April 2016 23 April 2016 108.6678 27.97648   
51 4 April 2016 10 July 2016 108.7497 28.02282   
18 4 April 2016 30 July 2016 108.7404 28.02277   
16 6 April 2016 31 July 2016 108.5902 27.91872   
17 6 April 2016 25 June 2016 108.6088 27.92623   
78 10 April 2016 28 July 2016 108.69 27.90617   
79 10 April 2016 28 July 2016 108.6875 27.89934   
 
 
